This hypothesis targets the presence of known CECbot indicators, which are frequently used by threat actors to establish initial footholds or execute malicious payloads within Azure environments. Proactively hunting for these IOCs allows the SOC to identify compromised assets early, preventing the botnet from leveraging cloud resources for command-and-control or lateral movement before it escalates to a high-severity incident.
Malware Family: CECbot Total IOCs: 3 IOC Types: domain
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| domain | iwonderifulovemeaswell.vg | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| domain | lovefromallareas.at | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| domain | iloveuevenifudontlovemeback.is | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - CECbot
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["iwonderifulovemeaswell.vg", "lovefromallareas.at", "iloveuevenifudontlovemeback.is"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
DnsEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
C:\Program Files\LegacyERP\bin\) or filter by the specific user account used for the service (e.g., svc_legacy_app) if the IOC is process-based.Environment: Lab or Role: Test in your CMDB or asset management system, or suppress alerts for the specific lab subnet (e.g., 10.20.0.0/24) during known maintenance windows.\\corp\scripts\) or filter by the parent process being a scheduled task service (svchost.exe or taskeng.exe) with a specific task name (e.g., Daily_Log_Rotation).