ThreatFox: Clipper IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies adversary activity consistent with the Clipper malware campaign by monitoring for specific indicators of compromise such as malicious file hashes and network connections. A proactive hunt is essential in Azure Sentinel to rapidly isolate infected endpoints before attackers can establish persistence or exfiltrate sensitive data through the identified IOCs.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Clipper Total IOCs: 3 IOC Types: sha256_hash, sha1_hash, md5_hash

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
sha1_hash	`56b6322ec04bb397dcdcab70d50275e689312c4e`	payload	2026-08-07	95%
md5_hash	`d8fcb7a4ef513ffff9cd2b3448c2b0e0`	payload	2026-08-07	95%
sha256_hash	`d4cfab5e052df4c049f258e226d11825cb37b0359be454b83241edd59b295f08`	payload	2026-08-07	95%

KQL: Hash Hunt

// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - Clipper
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["56b6322ec04bb397dcdcab70d50275e689312c4e", "d8fcb7a4ef513ffff9cd2b3448c2b0e0", "d4cfab5e052df4c049f258e226d11825cb37b0359be454b83241edd59b295f08"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`DeviceFileEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Clipper

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Clipper IOCs detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Automated Backup Script Execution
- Context: Enterprise backup solutions (e.g., Veeam, Commvault) often run scheduled PowerShell scripts that enumerate network shares or specific file paths to verify integrity before archiving. If the Clipper IOC includes a specific registry key check or a network connection to a known internal backup repository IP, these legitimate scans may trigger the rule.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion for processes named Veeam.Backup.Service.exe or commvault.cmd running under the context of the dedicated “Backup-Admin” service account. Additionally, exclude network connections where the destination IP falls within the internal backup subnet (e.g., 10.50.x.x).
Scenario: Endpoint Security Agent Health Checks
- Context: Modern EDR agents like CrowdStrike Falcon or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint perform routine “health checks” that query specific registry keys and network endpoints to validate agent configuration. If the Clipper IOC involves a specific hash or a connection to an internal update server, these periodic health probes can generate alerts.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude process names matching C-Service.exe (CrowdStrike) or MsMpEng.exe (Defender). Implement a filter that suppresses the alert if the source port is ephemeral and the destination port corresponds to the vendor’s known update service ports (e.g., TCP 443 to internal CDN IPs).
Scenario: Scheduled Group Policy Application
- Context: During business hours or off-hours, Windows Group Policy updates are applied via gpupdate.exe or scheduled tasks. These processes often query specific registry keys related to security policies (