This hunt targets the presence of known Aisuru indicators of compromise to identify potential lateral movement or persistence mechanisms established by this advanced threat actor. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical to detect early-stage intrusions and prevent the Aisuru group from escalating privileges or exfiltrating sensitive data before they can establish a foothold in the environment.
Malware Family: Aisuru Total IOCs: 17 IOC Types: ip:port
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 178[.]62[.]118[.]210:8443 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 167[.]71[.]45[.]235:8080 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 178[.]128[.]167[.]82:9034 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 209[.]38[.]218[.]95:8443 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 138[.]68[.]168[.]41:8001 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 144[.]126[.]224[.]25:8001 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 144[.]126[.]234[.]230:8001 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 159[.]65[.]83[.]2:8001 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 167[.]71[.]45[.]235:8001 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 178[.]128[.]167[.]82:8001 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 178[.]62[.]118[.]210:8001 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 188[.]166[.]158[.]18:8001 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 209[.]38[.]218[.]95:8001 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 46[.]101[.]36[.]181:8001 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 43[.]172[.]9[.]116:8001 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 188[.]166[.]158[.]18:8443 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 144[.]126[.]224[.]25:8443 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Aisuru
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["138.68.168.41", "159.65.83.2", "188.166.158.18", "144.126.224.25", "144.126.234.230", "178.62.118.210", "43.172.9.116", "178.128.167.82", "167.71.45.235", "209.38.218.95", "46.101.36.181"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["138.68.168.41", "159.65.83.2", "188.166.158.18", "144.126.224.25", "144.126.234.230", "178.62.118.210", "43.172.9.116", "178.128.167.82", "167.71.45.235", "209.38.218.95", "46.101.36.181"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Scenario: The Aisuru IOCs include specific IP addresses and domain names that may overlap with internal load balancers, reverse proxies, or CDN endpoints used for legitimate web application traffic. For example, if an IOC IP like 185.154.192.10 is actually the public-facing IP of an internal API gateway or a third-party SaaS provider (e.g., Salesforce or Slack) that is whitelisted in the network, normal outbound connections from user workstations to these services will trigger the rule.
10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12) or specific application server groups (e.g., App-Gateway-Cluster) when the destination matches the IOC IP. Additionally, exclude traffic where the source port is within the standard HTTP/HTTPS range (80, 443) and the destination is a known internal service IP.Scenario: The hunt package likely includes file hashes or specific file paths associated with Aisuru implants. In environments where developers or system administrators use specific open-source tools or custom scripts that share similar naming conventions or hash values (e.g., a generic update.exe or helper.dll placed in C:\Program Files\ or C:\Users\<admin>\AppData\Local\), legitimate software installations or updates via tools like Chocolatey, Ansible, or Puppet may match these IOCs.
C:\Program Files\, C:\Program Files (x86)\, or C:\Windows\System32\ unless the file name is explicitly unusual. Also, exclude events where the parent process is a known package