ThreatFox: Aisuru IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary activity by correlating four specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) linked to the Aisuru threat actor within Azure Sentinel logs. Proactively hunting for these IOCs is critical because early identification of this high-severity threat enables rapid containment and prevents potential lateral movement or data exfiltration before full-scale compromise occurs.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Aisuru Total IOCs: 4 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`159[.]203[.]172[.]232:8443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-09	100%
ip:port	`38[.]207[.]178[.]195:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-08-09	100%
ip:port	`167[.]172[.]188[.]177:34567`	botnet_cc	2026-08-09	100%
ip:port	`159[.]203[.]172[.]232:37215`	botnet_cc	2026-08-09	100%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Aisuru
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["167.172.188.177", "38.207.178.195", "159.203.172.232"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["167.172.188.177", "38.207.178.195", "159.203.172.232"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Aisuru

False Positive Guidance

Here are 3-5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Aisuru IOCs detection rule, tailored for an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Scheduled Malware Scanning via Endpoint Protection
- Context: The organization’s endpoint protection suite (e.g., Microsoft Defender Antivirus or CrowdStrike Falcon) performs nightly deep scans. During these scans, the engine may generate network traffic or process executions matching Aisuru IOCs as part of its signature update or heuristic analysis routines.
- Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Create a rule exclusion based on the specific Process Name (e.g., MsMpEng.exe or csfalcon.exe) and restrict the alert to only trigger if the process is running under a user context other than SYSTEM or Local Service. Alternatively, exclude traffic originating from the specific IP ranges of the Endpoint Management Servers.
Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment by Configuration Management Tools
- Context: During scheduled maintenance windows, tools like Microsoft SCCM (Configuration Manager) or Ansible Tower push updates to workstations. These agents often download patches or configuration scripts from internal repositories that may contain Aisuru-associated hashes or URLs as part of the payload verification process.
- Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Implement a time-based exclusion window (e.g., 02:00 - 06:00 on weekdays) for alerts generated by known management service accounts (e.g., DOMAIN\SCCM-Deploy-Account). Additionally, filter out events where the parent process is identified as the deployment agent (ccmsetup.exe or ansible-runner).
Scenario: Internal Security Research and Threat Hunting
- Context: The internal SOC team conducts periodic threat hunting exercises using tools like Splunk or Elastic SIEM. Analysts