ThreatFox: Mirai IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection rule identifies network traffic matching known Mirai botnet indicators of compromise to uncover potential IoT device infections and command-and-control communications. Proactively hunting for these signatures in Azure Sentinel is critical to rapidly isolate compromised endpoints before they are leveraged for large-scale DDoS attacks or lateral movement within the enterprise network.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Mirai Total IOCs: 3 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`217[.]60[.]195[.]127:7249`	botnet_cc	2026-07-31	100%
ip:port	`92[.]38[.]167[.]76:34245`	botnet_cc	2026-07-31	75%
ip:port	`185[.]237[.]205[.]252:4837`	botnet_cc	2026-07-31	75%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Mirai
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["92.38.167.76", "185.237.205.252", "217.60.195.127"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["92.38.167.76", "185.237.205.252", "217.60.195.127"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Mirai

False Positive Guidance

False Positive Scenarios for “ThreatFox: Mirai IOCs” Rule

Scenario: Scheduled Firmware Updates on IoT Devices
- Context: Enterprise IT teams often run automated firmware update scripts (e.g., using Ansible or PowerShell) across a fleet of networked cameras, printers, and smart sensors. These devices frequently communicate with vendor update servers that share IP addresses or domain names with known Mirai botnet command-and-control (C2) nodes.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion rule based on the specific source hosts (e.g., HostGroup: IoT-Managed) and destination ports commonly used for updates (e.g., Port 80, 443, or 5671). Additionally, exclude traffic occurring during the defined maintenance window (e.g., TimeOfDay: 02:00–04:00).
Scenario: Internal Vulnerability Scanning by Security Tools
- Context: Automated vulnerability scanners like Tenable Nessus, Qualys, or Rapid7 InsightVM actively probe internal and external assets. These tools often generate traffic patterns (specifically TCP SYN scans on ports 23, 80, 443) that mimic the initial reconnaissance phase of a Mirai infection, triggering alerts when scanning devices known to host Mirai-related IOCs.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude all source IPs belonging to the security team’s management subnet (e.g., 10.20.50.x) and filter out traffic where the user agent string contains specific scanner identifiers (e.g., User-Agent: Tenable-Nessus or Qualys-Scanner).
Scenario: Cloud Backup and Synchronization Jobs
- Context: Enterprise backup solutions such as Veeam, **