ThreatFox: SmartApeSG IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt targets adversary activity involving specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) linked to the SmartApeSG threat actor, which may signal early-stage reconnaissance or lateral movement within the network. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical because their high severity suggests a sophisticated campaign that requires immediate correlation with existing telemetry to prevent potential data exfiltration before automated alerts trigger.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: SmartApeSG Total IOCs: 4 IOC Types: domain, url

KQL: Domain Hunt

// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - SmartApeSG
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["aurorapavilion.top"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Url Hunt

// Hunt for access to known malicious URLs
// Source: ThreatFox - SmartApeSG
let malicious_urls = dynamic(["https://aurorapavilion.top/acl/principal-payload.js", "https://aurorapavilion.top/acl/trace-serializer", "https://aurorapavilion.top/acl/principal-core.js"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (malicious_urls)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

References

• ThreatFox — SmartApeSG

False Positive Guidance

Here are four specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: SmartApeSG IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with recommended filters or exclusions:

• Scheduled Antivirus Definition Updates via WSUS

  • Scenario: The organization utilizes Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) to push definition updates for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. During the nightly maintenance window (e.g., 02:00 AM), the update service downloads a specific signature package that matches one of the SmartApeSG IP addresses or file hashes. Because this traffic originates from the internal WSUS server rather than an external threat, it triggers the rule despite being benign.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create a detection exclusion for network connections where the Source Host is the designated WSUS Server (e.g., WSUS-PROD-01) and the destination port matches the update service traffic (typically TCP 8530 or 443). Alternatively, exclude file hashes associated with known Microsoft-signed binaries in the endpoint detection logic.

• Third-Party Cloud Backup Agent Connectivity

  • Scenario: The enterprise deploys Veeam Backup & Replication agents on critical SQL and Exchange servers. These agents periodically establish outbound connections to a specific cloud storage gateway or management console that shares an IP address with the SmartApeSG IOC set (often used for telemetry or license validation). This routine heartbeat check generates alerts during business hours, mimicking suspicious external communication.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Implement a rule exclusion based on the Process Name (VeeamAgent.exe or vbrservice) and the specific Destination IP range associated with the backup vendor’s cloud infrastructure. Ensure the exclusion applies to both inbound and outbound traffic initiated by these service accounts.

• Automated Patch Management Deployment (SCCM/MECM)