This hunt detects adversary activity involving specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) linked to the SmartApeSG threat actor to identify potential early-stage intrusions or lateral movement within the network. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical because it enables the SOC team to rapidly isolate and investigate high-severity threats before they escalate into broader data breaches or system compromises.
Malware Family: SmartApeSG Total IOCs: 4 IOC Types: domain, url
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| url | hxxps://chestnutstanza.top/realm/health-service | payload_delivery | 2026-07-30 | 100% |
| domain | chestnutstanza.top | payload_delivery | 2026-07-30 | 100% |
| url | hxxps://chestnutstanza.top/realm/acl-controller.js | payload_delivery | 2026-07-30 | 100% |
| domain | mulberrylodestar.top | botnet_cc | 2026-07-30 | 100% |
// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - SmartApeSG
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["chestnutstanza.top", "mulberrylodestar.top"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt for access to known malicious URLs
// Source: ThreatFox - SmartApeSG
let malicious_urls = dynamic(["https://chestnutstanza.top/realm/health-service", "https://chestnutstanza.top/realm/acl-controller.js"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (malicious_urls)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
DnsEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
UrlClickEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios and corresponding filters for the ThreatFox: SmartApeSG IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment:
Scenario: The Security Operations Center (SOC) team runs a manual threat intelligence feed update using Microsoft Defender for Endpoint or CrowdStrike Falcon, which automatically ingests the SmartApeSG IOC list into the local policy engine. This triggers the rule as the system queries the IOCs against its internal database, mimicking an active scan rather than a malicious event.
Process Name matches known SIEM/EDR management agents (e.g., DefenderService.exe, FalconSensor.exe) and the User Account is a dedicated service account like svc-threat-intel or admin-soc.Scenario: A scheduled nightly backup job utilizing Veeam Backup & Replication or Commvault performs a deep scan of the file system to verify integrity. The backup engine’s scanning module explicitly checks against known threat indicators, including the SmartApeSG signatures, causing the detection logic to fire during the window between 02:00 and 04:00 UTC.
01:30 and 05:00 on weekdays where the Parent Process Name is identified as VeeamTransportService.exe or CommServeAgent.exe.Scenario: The IT Operations team executes a quarterly vulnerability assessment using Tenable Nessus or Qualys, which includes a specific module for “Advanced Threat Intelligence Correlation.” During the scan, the tool actively resolves and validates the 4 SmartApeSG IOCs against the network inventory, generating detection alerts that are actually part of the assessment workflow. *