This hypothesis targets the presence of the php.shin_webshell, a high-severity backdoor that enables remote code execution and persistent access to Azure environments. Proactively hunting for these IOCs is critical to identify compromised web servers before adversaries leverage the webshell to establish footholds, exfiltrate sensitive data, or pivot deeper into the network.
Malware Family: php.shin_webshell Total IOCs: 4 IOC Types: domain
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| domain | vivyqyxi.workers.dev | botnet_cc | 2026-09-26 | 50% |
| domain | kojexala.workers.dev | botnet_cc | 2026-09-26 | 50% |
| domain | dahawetu.workers.dev | botnet_cc | 2026-09-26 | 50% |
| domain | iy1wc825fz.workers.dev | botnet_cc | 2026-09-26 | 50% |
// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - php.shin_webshell
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["vivyqyxi.workers.dev", "kojexala.workers.dev", "dahawetu.workers.dev", "iy1wc825fz.workers.dev"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
DnsEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
maintenance.php, debug.php) to legacy web servers for temporary task execution or data migration. These scripts often contain raw system() or exec() calls that match the behavioral signature of the webshell.
/var/www/html/dev/, /opt/legacy-app/tmp/) or allowlist known maintenance scripts by their exact SHA256 hash and file path.build-agent or ci-runner in your CMDB, or filter out files created within the last 15 minutes on containers that are scheduled for termination.class.php, util.php).
composer install or wp-cli logs) and exclude files within the /wp-content/plugins/ or /modules/ directories if the file timestamp aligns with a known plugin update event.