ThreatFox: Creal Stealer IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

Creal Stealer is a data-stealing malware that exfiltrates credentials and system information, indicating an adversary is actively harvesting sensitive assets for lateral movement or persistence. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to identify compromised endpoints early, mitigating the risk of credential reuse and unauthorized data exfiltration before the threat actor achieves their objectives.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Creal Stealer Total IOCs: 3 IOC Types: sha1_hash, md5_hash, sha256_hash

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
sha256_hash	`906bfba39450f926de1d5bd118cb802f1a10c0da675712483fefd8c8920b44eb`	payload	2026-09-21	95%
sha1_hash	`9cecd6c1b5b33797f5b3eb57071f19494f4c901f`	payload	2026-09-21	95%
md5_hash	`ee80f6462e667eaedac1d1303aa44192`	payload	2026-09-21	95%

KQL: Hash Hunt

// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - Creal Stealer
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["906bfba39450f926de1d5bd118cb802f1a10c0da675712483fefd8c8920b44eb", "9cecd6c1b5b33797f5b3eb57071f19494f4c901f", "ee80f6462e667eaedac1d1303aa44192"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`DeviceFileEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Creal Stealer

False Positive Guidance

Scenario: Automated Credential Harvesting by Enterprise Password Managers
- Context: Tools like 1Password, Bitwarden, or KeePass often run background services or scheduled tasks that read browser credential stores (Chrome, Firefox, Edge) to sync data or update vaults. If the detection rule flags file access to specific browser profile directories (e.g., AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data) or specific registry keys for saved passwords, these legitimate sync processes will trigger alerts.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude known parent processes associated with major password managers (e.g., 1Password.exe, bitwarden.exe, KeePass.exe) or specific scheduled task names (e.g., \1Password\Sync, \Bitwarden\Update) from the detection logic.
Scenario: Browser Extension Updates and Local Storage Access
- Context: Many enterprise-approved browser extensions (e.g., SSO integrations, security scanners, or productivity tools) require read access to local storage files, cookies, or session tokens to maintain authentication state or log activity. This can mimic the behavior of a stealer reading credential files.
- Filter/Exclusion: Whitelist specific browser extension IDs or known legitimate extension processes (e.g., chrome.exe with specific command-line arguments indicating an extension update) and exclude file paths under AppData\Local\Temp or specific extension cache directories if the rule targets temporary file creation.
Scenario: Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Agent Telemetry Collection
- Context: EDR agents (e.g., CrowdStrike, Carbon Black, SentinelOne) continuously monitor and collect telemetry, including memory dumps, process trees, and file metadata. If the rule detects file creation or modification in user profile directories or reads specific credential-related files, the EDR agent’s own collection service may