ThreatFox: Creal Stealer IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary behavior involving the deployment of Creal Stealer by monitoring for specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) that signal active credential and data theft operations. A SOC team should proactively hunt for these signals in Azure Sentinel to rapidly identify compromised endpoints, prevent lateral movement, and mitigate potential data exfiltration before significant impact occurs.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Creal Stealer Total IOCs: 3 IOC Types: sha1_hash, sha256_hash, md5_hash

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
sha1_hash	`8883ff5ff4ba025a42255ce0fa45ce7bf5c2c146`	payload	2026-07-27	95%
md5_hash	`148d43b07def3619cf07a1d440892e6f`	payload	2026-07-27	95%
sha256_hash	`169fd9264d4e5b84e514cd34a0e69c2c56667393546434282f8957bc045a091e`	payload	2026-07-27	95%

KQL: Hash Hunt

// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - Creal Stealer
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["8883ff5ff4ba025a42255ce0fa45ce7bf5c2c146", "148d43b07def3619cf07a1d440892e6f", "169fd9264d4e5b84e514cd34a0e69c2c56667393546434282f8957bc045a091e"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`DeviceFileEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Creal Stealer

False Positive Guidance

Here are specific false positive scenarios and corresponding filters for the ThreatFox: Creal Stealer IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Antivirus Engine Updates
- Context: Enterprise endpoint protection suites (e.g., Microsoft Defender, CrowdStrike Falcon) frequently download definition updates or threat intelligence feeds from external repositories. If the Creal Stealer IOC list includes a domain or hash used by these vendors for update distribution, the ingestion of these files will trigger alerts.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude traffic originating from known AV vendor IP ranges (e.g., 13.107.4.x for Microsoft) and specific process names like MsMpEng.exe, Cfservice.exe, or FalconSensor.exe. Additionally, filter out events where the file extension is .cab or .msu which are typical for update packages.
Scenario: Scheduled Software Deployment Jobs
- Context: IT Operations teams utilize tools like SCCM (System Center Configuration Manager) or Intune to push software patches and application installations via scheduled tasks. If a deployment package contains an installer that matches one of the Creal Stealer IOCs (e.g., a specific SHA-256 hash used in a common utility), the execution during maintenance windows will generate false positives.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion for process paths located within standard enterprise deployment directories, such as C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\MCCM or C:\Windows\CCM. Furthermore, filter events occurring only during defined “maintenance windows” (e.g., 02:00–04:00 UTC) where the user context is a dedicated service account like DOMAIN\SCCM-Deploy-Svc.
Scenario: Third-Party Cloud Backup Agents
- Context: Background backup