ThreatFox: Venus Stealer IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects the presence of the Venus Stealer malware, which actively compromises systems by stealing and exfiltrating sensitive credentials to enable lateral movement and data theft. Proactively hunting for these indicators in Azure Sentinel is critical to identify early-stage infections before adversaries can establish persistence or escalate privileges within the environment.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Venus Stealer Total IOCs: 21 IOC Types: sha256_hash, sha1_hash, md5_hash

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
sha1_hash	32181b725f0ebada1c09c1de78c97d8a2fef74c1	payload	2026-08-07	95%
md5_hash	ec4577b2e1c7bcc6f903cfb0bdc02f64	payload	2026-08-07	95%
sha256_hash	f3ef2636d9b60715c2ea7c032cfd20492b7701bfa72ed3652b2bc540760988a0	payload	2026-08-07	95%
sha1_hash	4bd636293f63519b3f1f438fa164a1f5cc10fc53	payload	2026-08-07	95%
md5_hash	5be302261ca861b71f8b75a21e635618	payload	2026-08-07	95%
sha256_hash	2f029858b8ecca8fb6c156eb2d046a2463e8b67d356c1003e5567339681a71be	payload	2026-08-07	95%
sha256_hash	e2affa0d6d98ca6cd8dbb05f8db955a71127b37c631a9cea4c967bdc992c93e6	payload	2026-08-07	95%
sha1_hash	cbe184ae6fff5254b172b160e127de27dee3409e	payload	2026-08-07	95%
md5_hash	05c80e5463a628b7c823595f3b1f4bbf	payload	2026-08-07	95%
sha1_hash	9ba5a8bf9564e71f333406b3e4962cac35e33a38	payload	2026-08-07	95%
md5_hash	066dab36fbf44cfa930929d002a07cb3	payload	2026-08-07	95%
sha256_hash	84b8ec2f3b29a10f88d21fc7617cdfecac1c2c76303086b41471beb5f563f65c	payload	2026-08-07	95%
md5_hash	dc5235041961a6f4de3d35e1a13a1b93	payload	2026-08-07	95%
sha256_hash	55fd126063af89eb1c5639a56dcf365f2e817813a45758b3f12a18f12d5561d1	payload	2026-08-07	95%
sha1_hash	011d0f62705b791f0931356d0fcfb30079c546b7	payload	2026-08-07	95%
sha1_hash	f36d28dcd12a3995f0d1b95530720f5dbf4a974c	payload	2026-08-07	95%
md5_hash	2af59df51773ab85d855e54abf3832ee	payload	2026-08-07	95%
sha256_hash	7e1e424f3c184c3c037235494158be38a9e7b15e0bd4a97c7f854ab03a1f09ed	payload	2026-08-07	95%
sha256_hash	644667c869b560afdd523a5c2dae1e4a6753481f7b155df378cd59377e4b2b55	payload	2026-08-07	95%
sha1_hash	b6406eecefa66d9fbfbe721d1bb3c38c1ddbc91a	payload	2026-08-07	95%
md5_hash	9d30b8f55df5cd82604271e8ee6f727d	payload	2026-08-07	95%

KQL: Hash Hunt

// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - Venus Stealer
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["32181b725f0ebada1c09c1de78c97d8a2fef74c1", "ec4577b2e1c7bcc6f903cfb0bdc02f64", "f3ef2636d9b60715c2ea7c032cfd20492b7701bfa72ed3652b2bc540760988a0", "4bd636293f63519b3f1f438fa164a1f5cc10fc53", "5be302261ca861b71f8b75a21e635618", "2f029858b8ecca8fb6c156eb2d046a2463e8b67d356c1003e5567339681a71be", "e2affa0d6d98ca6cd8dbb05f8db955a71127b37c631a9cea4c967bdc992c93e6", "cbe184ae6fff5254b172b160e127de27dee3409e", "05c80e5463a628b7c823595f3b1f4bbf", "9ba5a8bf9564e71f333406b3e4962cac35e33a38", "066dab36fbf44cfa930929d002a07cb3", "84b8ec2f3b29a10f88d21fc7617cdfecac1c2c76303086b41471beb5f563f65c", "dc5235041961a6f4de3d35e1a13a1b93", "55fd126063af89eb1c5639a56dcf365f2e817813a45758b3f12a18f12d5561d1", "011d0f62705b791f0931356d0fcfb30079c546b7", "f36d28dcd12a3995f0d1b95530720f5dbf4a974c", "2af59df51773ab85d855e54abf3832ee", "7e1e424f3c184c3c037235494158be38a9e7b15e0bd4a97c7f854ab03a1f09ed", "644667c869b560afdd523a5c2dae1e4a6753481f7b155df378cd59377e4b2b55", "b6406eecefa66d9fbfbe721d1bb3c38c1ddbc91a", "9d30b8f55df5cd82604271e8ee6f727d"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
DeviceFileEvents	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

• ThreatFox — Venus Stealer

False Positive Guidance

Here are 3-5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Venus Stealer IOCs detection rule, along with suggested filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:

• Scenario: Endpoint Protection Scans by Defender or CrowdStrike

  • Context: Enterprise endpoint protection agents (e.g., Microsoft Defender Antivirus, CrowdStrike Falcon) frequently perform scheduled scans that generate network traffic matching the IOCs of credential stealer tools. These agents often initiate outbound connections to update definition databases or upload telemetry data using ports and user-agent strings similar to those used by Venus Stealer.
  • Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion rule based on the Process Name (e.g., MsMpEng.exe, CsFalconService.exe) AND User Account set to SYSTEM. Alternatively, exclude traffic originating from known security management servers (e.g., SCCM or Intune endpoints) where the destination IP is a verified vendor cloud endpoint.

• Scenario: Scheduled Backup Jobs via Veeam or Commvault

  • Context: Automated backup solutions like Veeam Backup & Replication or Commvault often run nightly jobs that involve reading large volumes of user data (including credential stores) and exfiltrating them to a central repository. The network signatures generated during the “data transfer” phase can mimic the exfiltration behavior of Venus Stealer, particularly when accessing shared drives containing sensitive HR or Finance files.
  • Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Implement an exclusion based on Process Path (e.g., C:\Program Files\Veeam\Backup and Replication\...) combined with a specific Scheduled Task Name (e.g., “Veeam Backup Job - Nightly”). Additionally, filter out traffic where the destination IP belongs to the internal backup infrastructure subnet.

• **Scenario: Cloud