ThreatFox: Venus Stealer IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary behavior where malicious actors deploy the Venus Stealer to exfiltrate sensitive credentials and data by leveraging specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) such as unique file hashes and network artifacts. A SOC team should proactively hunt for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel to identify early-stage infections before attackers can establish persistence or escalate privileges within the cloud environment.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Venus Stealer Total IOCs: 6 IOC Types: md5_hash, sha256_hash, sha1_hash

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
md5_hash	`0ec313029dce62c5ee7aa979263f208b`	payload	2026-07-24	95%
md5_hash	`8316c11965ea33d19a0b81e1b1d3e1c1`	payload	2026-07-24	95%
sha256_hash	`23135f7a9ef043ebf31d296b08b93b1a636ce43f9ea490afe778433c024726a7`	payload	2026-07-24	95%
sha1_hash	`ad9b61dd4558239dc97d4580439ab2f4ddd03f52`	payload	2026-07-24	95%
sha256_hash	`2ecc8f99a7860a6806347bc55842e71f2baa81afeffd7f0dbcebe22da5228a2e`	payload	2026-07-24	95%
sha1_hash	`919b5673aced7f5b239450ff52c3c4d492249c1c`	payload	2026-07-24	95%

KQL: Hash Hunt

// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - Venus Stealer
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["0ec313029dce62c5ee7aa979263f208b", "8316c11965ea33d19a0b81e1b1d3e1c1", "23135f7a9ef043ebf31d296b08b93b1a636ce43f9ea490afe778433c024726a7", "ad9b61dd4558239dc97d4580439ab2f4ddd03f52", "2ecc8f99a7860a6806347bc55842e71f2baa81afeffd7f0dbcebe22da5228a2e", "919b5673aced7f5b239450ff52c3c4d492249c1c"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`DeviceFileEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Venus Stealer

False Positive Guidance

Here are specific false positive scenarios and corresponding filters for the ThreatFox: Venus Stealer IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Automated Security Tool Updates
- Context: Enterprise endpoint protection suites (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) frequently download definition updates or configuration scripts from trusted vendor repositories. These downloads often match the specific hash signatures or network destinations flagged as Venus Stealer IOCs because they are hosted on similar infrastructure or share common certificate authorities.
- Filter/Exclusion: Add a whitelist entry in the detection logic to exclude processes belonging to known security vendors (e.g., CrowdStrike.exe, MsMpEng.exe) and their associated update services (UpdateService.exe). Additionally, filter out network traffic originating from trusted internal update servers or specific vendor IP ranges.
Scenario: Scheduled Admin Deployment Jobs
- Context: The IT Operations team utilizes PowerShell scripts executed via Task Scheduler to deploy software patches or configuration changes across the domain. These scripts often invoke powershell.exe with arguments that download artifacts from a central artifact repository (e.g., JFrog Artifactory, Nexus), which may align with the IOCs associated with Venus Stealer’s command-and-control patterns.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude alerts where the parent process is TaskSchedulerService.exe or svchost.exe running under a specific administrative service account (e.g., DOMAIN\IT-Deploy-SVC). Implement a logic check to suppress alerts if the script path matches known deployment directories (e.g., C:\Program Files\DeploymentTools\Scripts\).
Scenario: Cloud Backup and Synchronization Services
- Context: Enterprise data loss prevention and backup solutions (such as Veeam, Rubrik, or Microsoft OneDrive for Business) perform continuous synchronization of user files. These agents