ThreatFox: Venus Stealer IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary behavior involving the deployment of Venus Stealer indicators to exfiltrate sensitive credentials and system data from compromised endpoints. A SOC team should proactively search for these specific IOCs within Azure Sentinel to rapidly identify active infections and prevent potential lateral movement before critical assets are breached.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Venus Stealer Total IOCs: 6 IOC Types: sha1_hash, sha256_hash, md5_hash

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
sha1_hash	`91b31807f78c59ac463c15e2a4a94d3e4ec85958`	payload	2026-07-27	95%
md5_hash	`653498f67781d06904988a7c36d7097e`	payload	2026-07-27	95%
sha256_hash	`600cf8533d43cc3b073ab18ed728cb4c9c037870c53ab8f0eb66bf225a3ac7e3`	payload	2026-07-27	95%
sha256_hash	`7d98375b03ed4def16841cc9b749a9297701edf20cba2f6f64bf96fcc995c79d`	payload	2026-07-27	95%
sha1_hash	`6dbce49761da2db96277b1c7cd65176ca9b7fa58`	payload	2026-07-27	95%
md5_hash	`39763d60e7122f64bd38797e83ef7977`	payload	2026-07-27	95%

KQL: Hash Hunt

// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - Venus Stealer
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["91b31807f78c59ac463c15e2a4a94d3e4ec85958", "653498f67781d06904988a7c36d7097e", "600cf8533d43cc3b073ab18ed728cb4c9c037870c53ab8f0eb66bf225a3ac7e3", "7d98375b03ed4def16841cc9b749a9297701edf20cba2f6f64bf96fcc995c79d", "6dbce49761da2db96277b1c7cd65176ca9b7fa58", "39763d60e7122f64bd38797e83ef7977"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`DeviceFileEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Venus Stealer

False Positive Guidance

Here are specific false positive scenarios and corresponding exclusion strategies for the ThreatFox: Venus Stealer IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment:

Scenario 1: Endpoint Protection Scanning of Quarantine Archives
- Context: Enterprise EDR solutions (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) frequently scan large quarantine archives containing historical malware samples. If the quarantine database includes a previously analyzed sample matching one of the Venus Stealer IOCs (such as a specific hash or certificate thumbprint), the scanner may trigger the detection during its scheduled nightly deep-scan job.
- Exclusion Strategy: Create an exclusion rule targeting the EDR service account and process names (e.g., C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\fs_qc.exe or MsMpEng.exe) when accessing paths designated for quarantine storage (e.g., C:\CrowdStrike\Quarantine or C:\Windows\System32\comapp).
Scenario 2: Scheduled Patch Deployment and Software Inventory
- Context: Automated patch management tools like Ivanti Neurons or SCCM (System Center Configuration Manager) often deploy software updates that include dependencies or runtime libraries matching the Venus Stealer IOCs. For instance, a scheduled job running at 02:00 AM might install a .NET framework update or a Java Runtime Environment that shares a specific file hash with the stealer’s known indicators.
- Exclusion Strategy: Implement a time-based exclusion window (e.g., 01:30–03:00) for detection triggers originating from the patch management service account (e.g., NT SERVICE\IvantiPatch or SYSTEM) specifically within the C:\Program Files\PatchManagement directory.
Scenario 3: Backup and Archiving Operations on Shared Drives *