This rule detects potential compromise by matching network traffic or endpoint telemetry against seven IOCs linked to an unidentified malware strain, indicating that an adversary may be establishing a foothold or executing malicious payloads. Proactively hunting for these indicators in Azure Sentinel is critical because the lack of a known malware classification necessitates rapid investigation to determine the specific threat actor, impact scope, and necessary containment actions before the unknown variant propagates.
Malware Family: Unknown malware Total IOCs: 7 IOC Types: sha256_hash, ip:port, url
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 209[.]38[.]224[.]48:7443 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 75% |
| sha256_hash | 13e3e1310dd9e9210ed937a651361be16b554be2d20ce5ae06b1dcf610dda603 | payload | 2026-09-19 | 75% |
| url | hxxps://cik07-cos[.]7moor-fs2.com/im/4d2c3f00-7d4c-11e5-af15-41bf63ae4ea0/129fd90846a1e173/9221.txt | payload_delivery | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 106[.]52[.]255[.]211:13321 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-19 | 100% |
| ip:port | 187[.]124[.]49[.]109:2222 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-18 | 100% |
| ip:port | 187[.]124[.]49[.]109:8080 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-18 | 100% |
| ip:port | 187[.]124[.]49[.]109:80 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-18 | 100% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Unknown malware
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["209.38.224.48", "106.52.255.211", "187.124.49.109"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["209.38.224.48", "106.52.255.211", "187.124.49.109"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
// Hunt for access to known malicious URLs
// Source: ThreatFox - Unknown malware
let malicious_urls = dynamic(["https://cik07-cos.7moor-fs2.com/im/4d2c3f00-7d4c-11e5-af15-41bf63ae4ea0/129fd90846a1e173/9221.txt"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (malicious_urls)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough
| order by Timestamp desc
// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - Unknown malware
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["13e3e1310dd9e9210ed937a651361be16b554be2d20ce5ae06b1dcf610dda603"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceFileEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
UrlClickEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Scenario: A DevOps engineer uses curl or wget to download a specific binary or script from a GitHub repository or internal artifact registry (e.g., https://github.com/.../build.sh) for a CI/CD pipeline update, where the SHA256 hash matches one of the 7 IOCs due to a shared dependency or a known benign variant of the file.
devops or ci-cd service group, or filter by process name curl/wget when the destination path is within /opt/ci/ or /var/lib/jenkins/.Scenario: An IT administrator performs a manual patching task on a legacy Windows server, downloading a specific .exe installer (e.g., setup.exe for a niche monitoring agent) from an internal file share or a vendor’s download portal, where the file hash coincidentally matches an IOC listed for a rare malware strain.
10.20.0.0/16) and the process is powershell.exe or cmd.exe executing a download command, or allowlist the specific SHA256 hash for the known vendor installer.Scenario: A scheduled task on a Linux application server runs a daily backup script that fetches a configuration file or plugin update from an internal Nexus or Artifactory repository, where the downloaded artifact’s hash matches an IOC due to a shared library component used by both the malware and the legitimate application.
python or bash executing a script from /etc/cron.d/ or /opt/app/scripts/, and the destination