This hypothesis targets the presence of specific network indicators associated with unknown malware, suggesting that an adversary may have established a foothold or is actively communicating with a Command and Control server. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical to identify compromised assets early, as unknown malware often lacks distinct behavioral signatures and relies on stealthy network connections to evade standard detection mechanisms.
Malware Family: Unknown malware Total IOCs: 11 IOC Types: ip:port, url, sha256_hash, domain
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 192[.]236[.]166[.]73:8443 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-21 | 75% |
| ip:port | 13[.]232[.]187[.]232:7443 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-21 | 75% |
| sha256_hash | 07623448429a02c23d568207e8ff42f08578bdc7fc626d0aa1ad5a56f880853d | payload | 2026-09-21 | 75% |
| ip:port | 18[.]224[.]224[.]66:7443 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-21 | 100% |
| ip:port | 81[.]177[.]214[.]196:8080 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-21 | 75% |
| ip:port | 176[.]65[.]148[.]10:80 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-21 | 50% |
| ip:port | 176[.]65[.]148[.]10:8080 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-21 | 50% |
| domain | i[.]131422.com | payload_delivery | 2026-09-21 | 75% |
| domain | data-recovery-melbourne.com.au | payload_delivery | 2026-09-21 | 75% |
| domain | colombiacocajo.cc | payload_delivery | 2026-09-21 | 90% |
| url | hxxps://meetmeetmeetmeet.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi | payload_delivery | 2026-09-21 | 90% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Unknown malware
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["13.232.187.232", "81.177.214.196", "18.224.224.66", "176.65.148.10", "192.236.166.73"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["13.232.187.232", "81.177.214.196", "18.224.224.66", "176.65.148.10", "192.236.166.73"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - Unknown malware
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["i.131422.com", "data-recovery-melbourne.com.au", "colombiacocajo.cc"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt for access to known malicious URLs
// Source: ThreatFox - Unknown malware
let malicious_urls = dynamic(["https://meetmeetmeetmeet.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (malicious_urls)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough
| order by Timestamp desc
// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - Unknown malware
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["07623448429a02c23d568207e8ff42f08578bdc7fc626d0aa1ad5a56f880853d"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceFileEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DnsEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
UrlClickEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Scenario: A security team deploys a new YARA rule or Sigma rule via a configuration management tool (e.g., Ansible, Puppet) that includes a hash or IP address from the ThreatFox IOC list as part of a validation test or documentation comment.
ansible, puppet-agent, chef-client) or where the event type is a file creation/modification by a service account rather than a user session.Scenario: A developer or DevOps engineer downloads a specific open-source library, SDK, or binary artifact (e.g., a .dll or .so file) from a public repository or internal artifact registry (e.g., JFrog Artifactory, Nexus) that happens to match one of the 11 IOCs due to a shared dependency or legacy build artifact.
C:\dev\, /home/user/.m2/, node_modules/) and the parent process is a build tool (e.g., msbuild.exe, gradle, npm, pip).Scenario: An automated backup or snapshot job (e.g., Veeam, Commvault, or native Windows VSS) creates a temporary copy of a file or database that matches an IOC hash, particularly if the original file was already present on the system before the IOC was added to the hunt package.
vssadmin.exe, veeamagent.exe, commvaultagent.exe) or where the file location is within a dedicated backup/snapshot directory (e.g., C:\ProgramData\Veeam\,