ThreatFox: AdaptixC2 IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary activity involving six specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) linked to the AdaptixC2 command and control infrastructure, which are often utilized by threat actors for persistent lateral movement and data exfiltration. Proactively hunting for these IOCs within Azure Sentinel is critical because early identification of AdaptixC2 traffic can reveal stealthy post-compromise operations that may evade standard signature-based detections, allowing the SOC team to contain threats before they escalate into significant breaches.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: AdaptixC2 Total IOCs: 6 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`45[.]142[.]141[.]139:443`	botnet_cc	2026-07-22	75%
ip:port	`167[.]160[.]190[.]182:4321`	botnet_cc	2026-07-22	75%
ip:port	`47[.]99[.]196[.]178:7002`	botnet_cc	2026-07-22	100%
ip:port	`47[.]99[.]196[.]178:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-07-21	100%
ip:port	`47[.]99[.]196[.]178:443`	botnet_cc	2026-07-21	100%
ip:port	`47[.]99[.]196[.]178:80`	botnet_cc	2026-07-21	100%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - AdaptixC2
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["45.142.141.139", "47.99.196.178", "167.160.190.182"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["45.142.141.139", "47.99.196.178", "167.160.190.182"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — AdaptixC2

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: AdaptixC2 IOCs detection rule, tailored for an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Enterprise Endpoint Protection Scanning
- Context: The primary security agent (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) performs a scheduled deep scan of the network traffic logs. During this process, the agent’s internal telemetry engine queries known AdaptixC2 infrastructure to validate its own signature database updates, triggering the IOCs as external connections.
- Suggested Filter: Exclude processes where ProcessName matches FalconSensor.exe, MsMpEng.exe, or DefenderService.exe and the connection destination is within the internal corporate IP range (e.g., 10.x.x.x).
Scenario: Automated Patch Management Deployment
- Context: The IT Operations team utilizes a centralized patching tool like SCCM (System Center Configuration Manager) or Ivanti Neurons. During the nightly “Patch Tuesday” window, the deployment agent initiates outbound connections to the AdaptixC2 repository servers to download security definitions and vulnerability assessment modules.
- Suggested Filter: Create an exclusion for traffic originating from the SCCM service account (e.g., DOMAIN\CCMService) or specific scheduled task names containing “PatchDeployment” between 01:00 AM and 04:00 AM local time.
Scenario: Cloud Backup and Archiving Jobs
- Context: The organization runs a nightly backup job using Veeam Backup & Replication. As part of the data integrity check, Veeam queries external threat intelligence feeds (which may include AdaptixC2 IOCs) to verify that backed-up files do not contain known malicious signatures before archiving.
- Suggested Filter: