ThreatFox: AdaptixC2 IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary activity involving known indicators of compromise (IOCs) from the AdaptixC2 command and control infrastructure to identify potential active infections within the network. A SOC team should proactively search for these signals in Azure Sentinel to rapidly isolate compromised endpoints and mitigate lateral movement before the threat escalates, given the high severity associated with this specific C2 framework.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: AdaptixC2 Total IOCs: 11 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`139[.]162[.]113[.]221:64321`	botnet_cc	2026-08-09	75%
ip:port	`134[.]122[.]132[.]3:4321`	botnet_cc	2026-08-09	75%
ip:port	`124[.]221[.]215[.]82:9090`	botnet_cc	2026-08-09	75%
ip:port	`52[.]128[.]231[.]157:4321`	botnet_cc	2026-08-08	75%
ip:port	`52[.]128[.]231[.]158:4321`	botnet_cc	2026-08-08	75%
ip:port	`52[.]128[.]231[.]155:4321`	botnet_cc	2026-08-08	75%
ip:port	`52[.]128[.]231[.]156:4321`	botnet_cc	2026-08-08	75%
ip:port	`43[.]139[.]114[.]212:4321`	botnet_cc	2026-08-08	75%
ip:port	`194[.]69[.]162[.]217:4321`	botnet_cc	2026-08-08	75%
ip:port	`1[.]92[.]135[.]168:4321`	botnet_cc	2026-08-08	75%
ip:port	`124[.]221[.]215[.]82:80`	botnet_cc	2026-08-08	100%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - AdaptixC2
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["1.92.135.168", "52.128.231.155", "52.128.231.157", "194.69.162.217", "52.128.231.156", "134.122.132.3", "139.162.113.221", "43.139.114.212", "52.128.231.158", "124.221.215.82"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["1.92.135.168", "52.128.231.155", "52.128.231.157", "194.69.162.217", "52.128.231.156", "134.122.132.3", "139.162.113.221", "43.139.114.212", "52.128.231.158", "124.221.215.82"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — AdaptixC2

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: AdaptixC2 IOCs detection rule, along with targeted filtering strategies suitable for an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Legitimate Software Updates via Vendor Management Tools
- Context: Enterprise endpoint management solutions like Microsoft Intune, Jamf Pro, or Ivanti Neurons frequently push software updates that communicate with the same cloud infrastructure or download artifacts matching AdaptixC2 IOCs (e.g., specific DLLs or executable hashes). These tools often run as background services during business hours.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude network traffic and process execution events where the parent process is IntuneAgent.exe, JamfProService.exe, or IvantiAgent.exe. Additionally, filter out alerts originating from the specific IP ranges of these vendor update servers if they overlap with the IOC list.
Scenario: Scheduled Security Scans by Antivirus Solutions
- Context: During nightly scheduled scans, enterprise antivirus engines such as CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne, or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint may generate network connections to their cloud management consoles. If the AdaptixC2 IOCs include common telemetry endpoints or shared certificate authorities used by these vendors, the scan traffic will trigger the rule.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create a whitelist based on process names FalconService.exe, SentinelOneAgent.exe, and MsMpEng.exe. Apply this exclusion specifically during defined maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00 – 06:00 local time) to reduce noise from routine scanning activities.
Scenario: Admin-Driven Patch Deployment via Configuration Management
- Context: System administrators using Ansible, Puppet, or SCCM (System Center Configuration Manager) often deploy patches that