ThreatFox: AdaptixC2 IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies adversary activity involving known AdaptixC2 command and control indicators that facilitate persistent remote access and data exfiltration. Proactively hunting for these specific IOCs within Azure Sentinel is critical to rapidly isolate compromised endpoints before attackers can establish a foothold or move laterally across the network.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: AdaptixC2 Total IOCs: 5 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`47[.]93[.]42[.]22:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-03	100%
ip:port	`47[.]93[.]42[.]22:80`	botnet_cc	2026-08-03	100%
ip:port	`173[.]199[.]70[.]174:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-08-03	100%
ip:port	`173[.]199[.]70[.]174:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-03	100%
ip:port	`173[.]199[.]70[.]174:80`	botnet_cc	2026-08-03	100%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - AdaptixC2
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["47.93.42.22", "173.199.70.174"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["47.93.42.22", "173.199.70.174"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — AdaptixC2

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: AdaptixC2 IOCs detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for a legitimate enterprise environment:

Scenario: Scheduled Backup Job Executing Cloud Sync
- Context: A nightly backup task running via Veeam Backup & Replication or Rubrik initiates a connection to an external cloud storage endpoint (e.g., AWS S3 or Azure Blob) that shares a known IP address or domain with the AdaptixC2 IOCs. The detection logic flags this routine data exfiltration as suspicious command-and-control traffic.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create a rule exclusion based on the specific Process Name (VeeamBackupService.exe or rubrik-agent) and restrict the alert to exclude traffic originating from the dedicated backup server subnet (e.g., 10.20.45.0/24).
Scenario: Endpoint Protection Cloud Communication
- Context: The enterprise’s endpoint detection and response (EDR) solution, such as CrowdStrike Falcon or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, performs a scheduled policy update or threat intelligence feed synchronization. This process connects to the vendor’s global update servers, which may overlap with the AdaptixC2 IOCs’ network signatures.
- Filter/Exclusion: Implement an exclusion filter targeting the specific EDR agent process (e.g., FalconSensor.exe or MsMpEng.exe) and exclude any outbound connections to the vendor’s official update domains (e.g., *.crowdstrike.com, *.microsoft.com).
Scenario: Admin Remote Management via RDP/SSH
- Context: A system administrator performs a routine maintenance window using Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Ansible Tower. During