This hunt detects adversary behavior where Agent Tesla malware establishes persistence by capturing keystrokes and exfiltrating sensitive credentials following a successful phishing campaign involving malicious attachments or links. A proactive search in Azure Sentinel is critical to identify early-stage infections before attackers can compromise banking data or escalate privileges, thereby mitigating the high risk of widespread credential theft.
Malware Family: Agent Tesla Total IOCs: 4 IOC Types: domain
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| domain | ftp.darlenemarino.cyou | botnet_cc | 2026-08-04 | 100% |
| domain | ftp.melrz.com | botnet_cc | 2026-08-04 | 100% |
| domain | ftp.lodenrandmarines.com | botnet_cc | 2026-08-04 | 100% |
| domain | ftp.raxclopent.info | botnet_cc | 2026-08-04 | 100% |
// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - Agent Tesla
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["ftp.darlenemarino.cyou", "ftp.melrz.com", "ftp.lodenrandmarines.com", "ftp.raxclopent.info"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
DnsEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Scenario 1: Scheduled Backup and Reporting Tools
svc_backup, splunk_forwarder) connecting to trusted internal IP ranges or specific cloud endpoints (e.g., *.veeam.com, *.splunkcloud.com).Scenario 2: Legitimate Phishing Simulation Platforms
*.knowbe4.com, *.proofpoint.com) and exclude traffic originating from these specific campaign IPs during active simulation windows.Scenario 3: Admin Remote Management Sessions