ThreatFox: AsyncRAT IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary behavior involving AsyncRAT remote access trojan activity by monitoring for four specific indicators of compromise within network and endpoint telemetry. A proactive search in Azure Sentinel is critical to identify early-stage AsyncRAT infections that may evade standard signature-based detection, thereby preventing potential data exfiltration or lateral movement before the threat escalates.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: AsyncRAT Total IOCs: 4 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`86[.]106[.]119[.]24:6606`	botnet_cc	2026-07-29	75%
ip:port	`67[.]210[.]97[.]40:6606`	botnet_cc	2026-07-29	75%
ip:port	`195[.]177[.]94[.]11:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-07-29	75%
ip:port	`168[.]222[.]97[.]120:1447`	botnet_cc	2026-07-29	75%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - AsyncRAT
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["67.210.97.40", "86.106.119.24", "195.177.94.11", "168.222.97.120"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["67.210.97.40", "86.106.119.24", "195.177.94.11", "168.222.97.120"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — AsyncRAT

False Positive Guidance

Here are specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: AsyncRAT IOCs detection rule, along with recommended filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Legitimate Remote Administration via RMM Tools
- Context: Enterprise Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) platforms like ManageEngine Desktop Central, SolarWinds N-central, or Lansweeper often utilize the same network ports, registry keys, or file hashes that AsyncRAT uses for command-and-control (C2). These tools frequently establish persistent connections to their cloud gateways, mimicking the C2 behavior of AsyncRAT.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create a whitelist exclusion based on the specific Process Name and Parent Process. Exclude alerts where ProcessName matches known RMM agents (e.g., DesktopCentralAgent.exe, n-central-agent.exe) running under the context of the System account or a dedicated Service Account. Additionally, filter out traffic destined for known RMM cloud IP ranges (e.g., AWS/Azure regions specific to the vendor).
Scenario: Scheduled Backup and Patching Jobs
- Context: Internal scheduled tasks using tools like Veeam Agent, WSUS (Windows Server Update Services), or Ansible Tower may trigger IOCs related to file creation in temporary directories or network connections that overlap with AsyncRAT’s payload execution patterns. For instance, a nightly patching job might create a temporary executable hash that matches an AsyncRAT IOC.
- Filter/Exclusion: Implement a time-based exclusion window (e.g., 02:00 – 04:00 UTC) for alerts originating from the Task Scheduler parent process (Schedule.exe). Furthermore, exclude file paths located within standard backup or patching directories such as `C:\ProgramData\Vee