ThreatFox: AsyncRAT IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary activity involving six specific indicators of compromise linked to the AsyncRAT remote access tool, which is frequently used by threat actors for command and control operations. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC team to identify early-stage infections and mitigate potential data exfiltration or lateral movement before the malware establishes a persistent foothold within the network.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: AsyncRAT Total IOCs: 6 IOC Types: ip:port, domain

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`64[.]224[.]17[.]167:7707`	botnet_cc	2026-07-23	75%
ip:port	`172[.]245[.]27[.]162:7707`	botnet_cc	2026-07-23	75%
ip:port	`157[.]20[.]182[.]22:9992`	botnet_cc	2026-07-23	75%
ip:port	`157[.]20[.]182[.]21:1444`	botnet_cc	2026-07-23	75%
ip:port	`109[.]122[.]18[.]70:20703`	botnet_cc	2026-07-23	75%
domain	`juanmisagui.freeddns.org`	botnet_cc	2026-07-23	75%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - AsyncRAT
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["64.224.17.167", "157.20.182.21", "172.245.27.162", "109.122.18.70", "157.20.182.22"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["64.224.17.167", "157.20.182.21", "172.245.27.162", "109.122.18.70", "157.20.182.22"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

KQL: Domain Hunt

// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - AsyncRAT
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["juanmisagui.freeddns.org"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DnsEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — AsyncRAT

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: AsyncRAT IOCs detection rule, including tailored filters and exclusions for an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Legitimate Remote Desktop Administration via RDP
- Context: Enterprise System Administrators frequently use tools like Microsoft Remote Desktop (mstsc.exe) or third-party solutions like TeamViewer to manage servers. These sessions often establish outbound connections to external IP addresses that may match the AsyncRAT C2 infrastructure, particularly if the admin is connecting from a non-standard location or using a cloud-based jump host.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude traffic where the source process is mstsc.exe, teamviewer.exe, or AnyDesk.exe and the destination port is restricted to standard RDP ports (3389, 5938) or known admin subnets. Additionally, exclude connections originating from the “IT-Admin” Active Directory group.
Scenario: Scheduled Backup Jobs Utilizing Cloud Storage
- Context: Automated backup solutions such as Veeam Backup & Replication, Rubrik, or Microsoft Azure Backup Agent run scheduled jobs that upload data to cloud repositories. These agents often communicate with specific endpoints that may share IP ranges or certificate hashes similar to the AsyncRAT IOCs, triggering alerts during peak backup windows (e.g., 02:00 – 04:00).
- Filter/Exclusion: Create a time-based exclusion for the rule between 01:00 and 05:00 local time on weekdays. Furthermore, exclude processes named VeeamAgent.exe, AzureBackupEngine.exe, or RubrikAgent.exe when they initiate outbound HTTPS connections to known backup service domains (e.g., *.azure.com, *.veeam.com).