ThreatFox: AsyncRAT IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary activity involving five specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) linked to the AsyncRAT remote access tool, which is frequently used by threat actors to establish persistent command and control channels on compromised endpoints. The SOC team should proactively hunt for these IOCs within Azure Sentinel because AsyncRAT’s sophisticated capabilities allow attackers to evade standard perimeter defenses, making early identification critical for preventing data exfiltration and lateral movement before the malware fully establishes its foothold.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: AsyncRAT Total IOCs: 5 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`94[.]154[.]32[.]56:27221`	botnet_cc	2026-07-27	75%
ip:port	`94[.]154[.]32[.]56:27220`	botnet_cc	2026-07-27	75%
ip:port	`46[.]151[.]182[.]76:7707`	botnet_cc	2026-07-27	75%
ip:port	`45[.]59[.]160[.]198:52203`	botnet_cc	2026-07-27	75%
ip:port	`204[.]44[.]69[.]230:6606`	botnet_cc	2026-07-27	75%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - AsyncRAT
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["45.59.160.198", "94.154.32.56", "204.44.69.230", "46.151.182.76"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["45.59.160.198", "94.154.32.56", "204.44.69.230", "46.151.182.76"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — AsyncRAT

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: AsyncRAT IOCs detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Legitimate Remote Administration via TeamViewer or AnyDesk
- Context: Enterprise IT helpdesk teams frequently use remote desktop tools like TeamViewer, AnyDesk, or Splashtop to troubleshoot user workstations. These tools often utilize similar network ports (e.g., 5938, 4012) and communication patterns that overlap with AsyncRAT’s C2 traffic, triggering the “Network Connection” IOC.
- Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes where the executable name matches TeamViewer.exe, AnyDesk.exe, or SplashtopService.exe running under the SYSTEM or specific helpdesk service accounts (e.g., DOMAIN\HelpDesk_Admin). Additionally, filter out traffic originating from known internal IP ranges dedicated to remote management servers.
Scenario: Scheduled Software Deployment via SCCM/Intune
- Context: During nightly maintenance windows, the enterprise uses Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Microsoft Intune to push updates and install new applications. The deployment agents often execute background scripts that download manifests or communicate with update servers using patterns similar to AsyncRAT’s “File Creation” and “Registry Modification” IOCs.
- Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Create a time-based exclusion for alerts occurring between 01:00 and 05:00 local time on workstations where the parent process is ccmexec.exe (SCCM) or IntuneManagementExtension.exe. Exclude events where the file path contains \Microsoft Intune Management Extension\ or \ConfigMgr\.
**Scenario: Automated Backup Agents (Vee