ThreatFox: AsyncRAT IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt hypothesis detects AsyncRAT activity by identifying suspicious outbound network connections to known command-and-control IPs and ports that indicate remote access capabilities such as command execution and data exfiltration. Proactively hunting for these indicators in Azure Sentinel is critical because AsyncRAT’s ability to establish persistent footholds via phishing or exploit kits allows adversaries to maintain long-term access, necessitating early detection before significant data theft occurs.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: AsyncRAT Total IOCs: 7 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`91[.]92[.]42[.]152:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-08-04	75%
ip:port	`178[.]16[.]53[.]68:7707`	botnet_cc	2026-08-04	75%
ip:port	`130[.]12[.]182[.]39:5333`	botnet_cc	2026-08-04	75%
ip:port	`178[.]16[.]55[.]104:8848`	botnet_cc	2026-08-04	75%
ip:port	`64[.]89[.]160[.]127:6680`	botnet_cc	2026-08-04	75%
ip:port	`136[.]115[.]85[.]178:80`	botnet_cc	2026-08-04	100%
ip:port	`195[.]177[.]94[.]210:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-04	100%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - AsyncRAT
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["195.177.94.210", "91.92.42.152", "178.16.53.68", "64.89.160.127", "130.12.182.39", "178.16.55.104", "136.115.85.178"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["195.177.94.210", "91.92.42.152", "178.16.53.68", "64.89.160.127", "130.12.182.39", "178.16.55.104", "136.115.85.178"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — AsyncRAT

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: AsyncRAT IOCs rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Legitimate Remote Desktop Administration via RDP
- Context: Enterprise System Administrators frequently use tools like Microsoft Remote Desktop (mstsc.exe) or TeamViewer to connect to workstations or servers. These connections often establish outbound TCP traffic on port 3389 (RDP) or specific TeamViewer ports, which can mimic the C2 communication patterns of AsyncRAT if the destination IP is a known corporate jump box or external support partner.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion for source processes mstsc.exe, teamviewer.exe, and rdpclip.exe connecting to whitelisted internal subnets (e.g., 10.x.x.x) or specific trusted external IP ranges used by the managed service provider.
Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Cloud Updates
- Context: Endpoint Protection platforms such as CrowdStrike Falcon, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, or SentinelOne perform scheduled cloud-based definition updates and telemetry uploads. These agents initiate outbound HTTPS connections to vendor update servers, often utilizing ports 443 or custom high-numbered ports that overlap with AsyncRAT’s C2 channels.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude traffic originating from the specific antivirus service executables (e.g., C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\FalconSensor\csfalcon.exe) destined for official vendor update domains (e.g., *.crowdstrike.com, *.microsoft.com) during standard maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00–04:00 local time).
Scenario: Automated Backup and Synchronization Jobs
- Context: Data