The detection identifies potential Brute Ratel C4 infrastructure by matching known IOCs associated with the adversary’s command and control activities. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior to detect early-stage compromise and disrupt the adversary’s communication and command capabilities within their Azure Sentinel environment.
IOC Summary
Malware Family: Brute Ratel C4 Total IOCs: 2 IOC Types: ip:port
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 163[.]172[.]174[.]237:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-06-04 | 75% |
| ip:port | 163[.]172[.]174[.]237:80 | botnet_cc | 2026-06-04 | 75% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Brute Ratel C4
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["163.172.174.237"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["163.172.174.237"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Scenario: Legitimate scheduled system backup using rsync
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes initiated by the root user or those matching the rsync command with known backup paths (e.g., /backup/ or /var/backups/).
Scenario: Admin task to update DNS records using nsupdate
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes initiated by the named service or users with sudo privileges performing DNS-related tasks with known domain names.
Scenario: Regular log rotation using logrotate
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes with the logrotate command and paths in /var/log/ or /etc/logrotate.d/.
Scenario: Use of curl or wget for legitimate API calls to internal services
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude traffic to internal IP ranges (e.g., 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16) or known internal APIs (e.g., /api/v1/health).
Scenario: Automated CI/CD pipeline using git to pull code from a private repository
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes initiated by CI/CD agents (e.g., jenkins, gitlab-runner) or with SSH keys matching known CI/CD key fingerprints.