ThreatFox: Cobalt Strike IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection rule identifies adversary activity involving known Cobalt Strike indicators of compromise (IOCs) that signal potential command and control or lateral movement within the network. Proactively hunting for these specific IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical to rapidly detect and contain established post-exploitation frameworks before adversaries can establish persistent access or exfiltrate sensitive data.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Cobalt Strike Total IOCs: 27 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`43[.]166[.]246[.]26:7010`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`43[.]166[.]246[.]26:7000`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`43[.]166[.]246[.]26:143`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`43[.]166[.]246[.]26:25`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`43[.]166[.]246[.]26:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`117[.]72[.]199[.]102:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`117[.]72[.]199[.]102:22`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`117[.]72[.]199[.]102:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`159[.]75[.]159[.]217:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`108[.]165[.]147[.]244:4444`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`47[.]108[.]77[.]36:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`151[.]244[.]243[.]42:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`193[.]112[.]95[.]180:8899`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`39[.]106[.]183[.]67:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`83[.]229[.]123[.]185:8443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`83[.]229[.]123[.]185:5555`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`47[.]108[.]77[.]36:81`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`159[.]75[.]159[.]217:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`159[.]75[.]159[.]217:8082`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`45[.]135[.]180[.]166:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	50%
ip:port	`154[.]36[.]167[.]17:80`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	50%
ip:port	`124[.]222[.]145[.]172:9999`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`124[.]222[.]145[.]172:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`124[.]222[.]145[.]172:8084`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%
ip:port	`124[.]222[.]145[.]172:8888`	botnet_cc	2026-08-01	100%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Cobalt Strike
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["123.57.243.182", "45.135.180.166", "151.244.243.42", "193.112.95.180", "47.108.77.36", "117.72.199.102", "39.106.183.67", "124.222.145.172", "83.229.123.185", "154.36.167.17", "108.165.147.244", "43.166.246.26", "159.75.159.217"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["123.57.243.182", "45.135.180.166", "151.244.243.42", "193.112.95.180", "47.108.77.36", "117.72.199.102", "39.106.183.67", "124.222.145.172", "83.229.123.185", "154.36.167.17", "108.165.147.244", "43.166.246.26", "159.75.159.217"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Cobalt Strike

False Positive Guidance

Here are specific false positive scenarios and corresponding exclusion strategies for the ThreatFox: Cobalt Strike IOCs detection rule:

Scenario: Scheduled Backup Jobs Executing via PowerShell or C# Scripts
- Context: Enterprise backup solutions (e.g., Veeam, Rubrik) often utilize scheduled tasks running PowerShell scripts that instantiate .NET assemblies to manage data replication. These scripts may generate network connections or process behaviors matching Cobalt Strike’s beacon communication patterns (specifically the beacon executable name or specific hash signatures).
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes where the parent process is a known backup service (e.g., Veeam.Backup.Service.exe, RubrikAgent.exe) and the file path resides within the vendor’s installation directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\Veeam\BackupAndReplication\).
Scenario: Internal DevOps CI/CD Pipelines Using Cobalt Strike for Testing
- Context: Security teams or QA departments often deploy a local instance of Cobalt Strike within the internal network to simulate attacks and test detection rules. These instances run on dedicated build servers (e.g., Jenkins, Azure Dev Agents) and generate IOCs identical to a real-world compromise during pipeline execution phases.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion based on host identity or IP range for known “Test Lab” subnets. Additionally, exclude events where the process beacon.exe is launched by CI/CD orchestrators like Jenkins.exe, AzureDevOpsAgent.exe, or TFSBuildAgent.exe.
Scenario: Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Tools Utilizing Cobalt Strike Components
- Context: Certain EDR platforms (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne) integrate Cobalt Strike’s telemetry libraries or use similar C2 frameworks for their own