ThreatFox: Cobalt Strike IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt hypothesis targets adversary behavior involving the deployment of Cobalt Strike beacons to establish persistent command and control channels within the network. A SOC team should proactively hunt for these specific IOCs in Azure Sentinel because early detection of this widely used post-exploitation tool is critical to preventing lateral movement and data exfiltration before the attacker fully establishes a foothold.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Cobalt Strike Total IOCs: 10 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`213[.]199[.]55[.]80:80`	botnet_cc	2026-08-11	100%
ip:port	`213[.]199[.]55[.]80:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-11	100%
ip:port	`106[.]75[.]139[.]193:22`	botnet_cc	2026-08-11	100%
ip:port	`192[.]252[.]185[.]78:65530`	botnet_cc	2026-08-11	100%
ip:port	`106[.]75[.]139[.]193:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-08-11	100%
ip:port	`106[.]75[.]139[.]193:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-11	100%
ip:port	`82[.]157[.]33[.]67:8000`	botnet_cc	2026-08-11	100%
ip:port	`139[.]162[.]38[.]41:9443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-11	100%
ip:port	`154[.]213[.]233[.]164:48305`	botnet_cc	2026-08-11	50%
ip:port	`52[.]202[.]75[.]213:8443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-11	50%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Cobalt Strike
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["106.75.139.193", "82.157.33.67", "52.202.75.213", "139.162.38.41", "154.213.233.164", "192.252.185.78", "213.199.55.80"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["106.75.139.193", "82.157.33.67", "52.202.75.213", "139.162.38.41", "154.213.233.164", "192.252.185.78", "213.199.55.80"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Cobalt Strike

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Cobalt Strike IOCs detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Legitimate Software Deployment via SCCM/Intune
- Context: Enterprise IT teams frequently use Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Microsoft Intune to deploy the Cobalt Strike “Beacon” client as a standard security monitoring tool or for internal vulnerability scanning. The deployment process often triggers the specific IOCs (e.g., beacon.exe with specific command-line arguments or registry keys) that this rule monitors.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion based on the Process Parent Name. If the parent process is ccmexec.exe (SCCM) or IntuneManagementExtension.exe, and the file path matches a known deployment directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\...), suppress the alert.
Scenario: Scheduled Internal Vulnerability Scanning Job
- Context: Security operations teams often run automated, scheduled vulnerability scans using Cobalt Strike Beacons deployed on a dedicated jump host or internal scanner server. These jobs run nightly via Windows Task Scheduler to map network assets and check for open ports, generating traffic patterns identical to an active attack campaign.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude alerts where the Source Host is a known “Scanner” asset group (e.g., AssetGroup = Security_Scan_Hosts) AND the Process Start Time falls within the defined maintenance window (e.g., 02:00 – 04:00 UTC). Additionally, filter by specific User Account used for automation (e.g., svc-vuln-scan).
Scenario: Development Environment Testing and CI/CD Pipelines *