This hunt detects adversary activity involving the DCRat remote access trojan by identifying specific indicators of compromise such as malicious file hashes and network connections. Proactively hunting for these signals in Azure Sentinel is critical to uncover early-stage lateral movement or command-and-control communications that may evade standard signature-based detection.
Malware Family: DCRat Total IOCs: 3 IOC Types: ip:port
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 176[.]97[.]114[.]8:8848 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-02 | 75% |
| ip:port | 213[.]165[.]69[.]19:2004 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-02 | 100% |
| ip:port | 91[.]92[.]40[.]194:5900 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-02 | 100% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - DCRat
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["213.165.69.19", "91.92.40.194", "176.97.114.8"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["213.165.69.19", "91.92.40.194", "176.97.114.8"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: DCRat IOCs detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:
Scenario: Automated Backup Agent Scanning
Veeam.Backup.Service.exe or commvault.cmd user context, specifically when the source port is within the standard backup range (e.g., 9400-9500) and the destination IP matches the known Veeam/Commvault update repository.Scenario: Scheduled PowerShell Health Checks
powershell.exe) that query internal monitoring dashboards or perform inventory checks. If these scripts invoke a specific HTTP library or download a signature file matching one of the DCRat IOCs, it generates a false hit during the nightly maintenance window (e.g., 02:00 – 04:00).powershell.exe processes initiated by the local system account (NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM) or a dedicated service account (e.g., svc-healthcheck).Scenario: Endpoint Protection Definition Updates