ThreatFox: Havoc IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection rule identifies adversary activity involving specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) linked to the Havoc post-exploitation framework, which attackers utilize to establish persistence and execute lateral movement within compromised networks. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical because early identification of Havoc artifacts enables the SOC team to rapidly isolate affected assets before adversaries can fully entrench their command-and-control infrastructure or escalate privileges.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Havoc Total IOCs: 3 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`206[.]189[.]40[.]107:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-07-25	100%
ip:port	`13[.]51[.]79[.]99:22`	botnet_cc	2026-07-25	100%
ip:port	`206[.]189[.]40[.]107:22`	botnet_cc	2026-07-25	100%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Havoc
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["206.189.40.107", "13.51.79.99"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["206.189.40.107", "13.51.79.99"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Havoc

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios and their corresponding filters/exclusions for the ThreatFox: Havoc IOCs detection rule:

Scenario: Security Team Manual Hunting with Threat Intelligence Platforms
- Context: The SOC team or threat intelligence analysts manually query the “Havoc” campaign indicators within tools like Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, CrowdStrike Falcon Insight, or Splunk Enterprise. They often run custom queries or import IOCs into a sandbox environment to validate new signatures, which triggers the detection logic.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude alerts where the source process is QueryService.exe, DefenderService.exe, or specific Splunk forwarder processes (splunkd.exe) running on designated security workstations (e.g., hostname pattern SEC-ANALYST-*).
Scenario: Scheduled Vulnerability Scanning and Patch Management
- Context: Enterprise-wide vulnerability scanners, such as Tenable Nessus, Qualys Cloud Agent, or Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM), periodically scan endpoints for known Havoc IOCs. These tools often inject the specific IOC hashes or network signatures into the endpoint agent during scheduled maintenance windows to verify patch levels.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create a time-based exclusion window (e.g., 02:00–04:00 UTC) for alerts originating from hosts tagged with VULN-SCAN or processes named tenable_agent.exe, qualys_daemon.exe, and ccmexec.exe.
Scenario: Automated Backup and Archiving Jobs
- Context: Enterprise backup solutions like Veeam Backup & Replication or Rubrik perform nightly integrity checks on critical data repositories. These jobs often reference specific file hashes or network signatures associated with the Havoc campaign to ensure data consistency,