ThreatFox: Havoc IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection rule identifies adversary activity involving specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) linked to the Havoc post-exploitation framework, which attackers often deploy to establish persistence and execute lateral movement within compromised networks. SOC teams should proactively hunt for these signatures in Azure Sentinel because early identification of Havoc artifacts enables rapid containment of advanced threats that leverage this toolchain for stealthy command-and-control operations before they escalate into broader incidents.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Havoc Total IOCs: 2 IOC Types: ip:port

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Havoc
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["167.172.142.69", "104.248.185.92"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["167.172.142.69", "104.248.185.92"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

References

• ThreatFox — Havoc

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Havoc IOCs rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:

• Scenario: Automated Vulnerability Scanning by Qualys or Tenable

  • Context: Enterprise vulnerability scanners (e.g., Qualys Cloud Agent, Tenable Nessus) frequently probe internal hosts to identify open ports and services. These agents often initiate outbound connections to external update servers or cloud repositories that share IP ranges or domain hashes with the Havoc IOCs, triggering a match during routine daily scans.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude traffic originating from specific service accounts (e.g., svc-qualys-agent) or filter by process path where the executable is located in known scanner directories (e.g., C:\Program Files\Qualys\PC Agent\ or C:\ProgramData\Tenable\Nessus\).

• Scenario: Scheduled Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Updates

  • Context: The Havoc IOCs may include domain names used by Microsoft’s update infrastructure. When the Windows Update service (usoc.dll) or the Antimalware Service Executable runs its scheduled daily definition updates, it connects to Microsoft cloud endpoints that might overlap with the detection logic, causing a match on legitimate telemetry traffic.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion rule for processes where ProcessName equals MsMpEng.exe or UpdateOrchestrator.exe, specifically when the destination port is 443 and the user context is SYSTEM.

• Scenario: Third-Party Backup Solutions (e.g., Veeam or Rubrik)

  • Context: Enterprise backup agents often communicate with cloud repositories or management consoles. If the Havoc IOCs encompass a specific IP range used by a major cloud provider (like AWS S3 or Azure Blob)