ThreatFox: Loda IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection rule identifies adversary activity by matching network and endpoint logs against known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) specific to the Loda threat actor. Proactively hunting for these signatures in Azure Sentinel is critical because early identification of Loda’s unique behavioral patterns enables rapid containment before lateral movement or data exfiltration occurs.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Loda Total IOCs: 2 IOC Types: ip:port, domain

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Loda
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["207.148.77.235"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["207.148.77.235"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

KQL: Domain Hunt

// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - Loda
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["my.thispc.net"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Required Data Sources

References

• ThreatFox — Loda

False Positive Guidance

Here are the documented false positive scenarios and corresponding exclusion strategies for the ThreatFox: Loda IOCs detection rule:

• Scenario: Automated Security Tool Updates

  • Context: The enterprise endpoint protection suite (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) automatically downloads a new definition package from the vendor’s cloud repository, which contains a hash matching a known “Loda” IOC. This often occurs during nightly maintenance windows.
  • Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion rule that ignores alerts where the Process Name matches the update service executable (e.g., FalconService.exe, MsMpEng.exe) and the User Account is a local system account (NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM).

• Scenario: Scheduled Backup Agent Communication

  • Context: The organization’s backup solution (e.g., Veeam Backup & Replication or Commvault) initiates a scheduled job to synchronize metadata with an external cloud storage gateway. The gateway’s communication module utilizes a shared library that triggers the Loda IOC signature during data handshakes.
  • Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Implement a time-based exclusion for alerts occurring between 01:00 and 05:00 UTC where the Source IP belongs to the internal backup subnet (e.g., 10.20.40.x) and the Process Path contains “Veeam” or “Commvault”.

• Scenario: Admin-Initiated Patch Deployment

  • Context: A System Administrator manually triggers a patch deployment using SCCM (System Center Configuration Manager) or Intune to push a specific security update. The deployment agent establishes a connection with the Loda-managed distribution point, generating network traffic that matches the detection logic.
  • Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Exclude alerts where