This detection rule identifies active communications between internal assets and known NetWire Remote Control infrastructure, signaling potential command-and-control activity from a sophisticated threat actor. Proactive hunting in Azure Sentinel is critical to rapidly isolate compromised endpoints and prevent lateral movement before adversaries can establish persistent access or exfiltrate sensitive data.
Malware Family: NetWire RC Total IOCs: 9 IOC Types: sha256_hash, md5_hash, sha1_hash
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| md5_hash | 1cebb153fcb26dcd06614a95276b22a3 | payload | 2026-08-04 | 95% |
| md5_hash | 6292b4f53c529bdafbb1476e7de48e73 | payload | 2026-08-04 | 95% |
| sha256_hash | 57e5da8f7c404c1754a866c1f8d51e31f9f21525c17e586ef48eb2a62fa4ef20 | payload | 2026-08-04 | 95% |
| sha1_hash | 2d7b8391c51937f7c11430a91013a115c315f92f | payload | 2026-08-04 | 95% |
| sha256_hash | a5508bc966bb8d4e0a4275dd96347d84ceecbdb1679fb27ddb4f568fb083faa2 | payload | 2026-08-04 | 95% |
| sha1_hash | 5a2317b228f48fa8f93665dc6a74fc38888b839a | payload | 2026-08-04 | 95% |
| sha1_hash | de34950c485f3fdaa49687cdd4c71cf6c906774d | payload | 2026-08-04 | 95% |
| md5_hash | 78ea9434eb06f6069346be4dc920e706 | payload | 2026-08-04 | 95% |
| sha256_hash | 0b74552f66e1fb88f401e0c27c9dd224219bc3698a556b8827c392cce5a1bbd3 | payload | 2026-08-04 | 95% |
// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - NetWire RC
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["1cebb153fcb26dcd06614a95276b22a3", "6292b4f53c529bdafbb1476e7de48e73", "57e5da8f7c404c1754a866c1f8d51e31f9f21525c17e586ef48eb2a62fa4ef20", "2d7b8391c51937f7c11430a91013a115c315f92f", "a5508bc966bb8d4e0a4275dd96347d84ceecbdb1679fb27ddb4f568fb083faa2", "5a2317b228f48fa8f93665dc6a74fc38888b839a", "de34950c485f3fdaa49687cdd4c71cf6c906774d", "78ea9434eb06f6069346be4dc920e706", "0b74552f66e1fb88f401e0c27c9dd224219bc3698a556b8827c392cce5a1bbd3"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
DeviceFileEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios and corresponding exclusion strategies for the ThreatFox: NetWire RC IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment:
Scenario: Endpoint Protection Scans via Scheduled Tasks
ProcessName matches known EDR service executables (e.g., FalconSensor.exe, MsMpEng.exe) AND the ParentProcessName is identified as a scheduled task runner (TaskHostW.exe or svchost.exe).Scenario: Legacy Remote Management Tools
SourceIP belongs to the internal IT Management VLAN (e.g., 10.x.x.x) and the ProcessImageName contains keywords such as “TeamViewer”, “AnyDesk”, or “SolarWinds”.Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment via SCCM/Intune