This hunt targets adversary activity involving specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) linked to the N-W0rm malware, which is known for its rapid propagation and data exfiltration capabilities across networked systems. Proactively hunting for these signatures in Azure Sentinel is critical because early detection allows the SOC team to isolate infected endpoints before lateral movement occurs, thereby minimizing potential data loss and operational disruption.
Malware Family: N-W0rm Total IOCs: 2 IOC Types: ip:port
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 178[.]66[.]70[.]14:10776 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-21 | 100% |
| ip:port | 188[.]32[.]41[.]18:10777 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-21 | 100% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - N-W0rm
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["178.66.70.14", "188.32.41.18"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["178.66.70.14", "188.32.41.18"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: N-W0rm IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with recommended filters or exclusions:
Antivirus Engine Updates and Scans
mssec.exe or symantec_antivirus_update.exe) running during scheduled maintenance windows.NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM) or the specific Service Account used by the AV management console during known maintenance hours (e.g., 02:00–04:00 AM).Patch Management and Software Deployment
powershell.exe), or deployment agents that execute on workstations during the “Patch Tuesday” cycle. These legitimate deployments often trigger file creation and execution events matching the worm’s behavioral profile.ccmexec.exe, jamfagentd). Implement a rule to suppress detections if the source IP belongs to the internal Software Distribution Server subnet and the event timestamp aligns with the organization’s scheduled deployment window.**Scheduled