This hunt hypothesis targets adversaries leveraging Overlord RAT to establish covert command-and-control channels through specific IP:port pairs following initial compromise via phishing or exploit kits. Proactive hunting in Azure Sentinel is critical to detect early-stage lateral movement and data exfiltration attempts before attackers can fully manipulate systems and extract sensitive information.
Malware Family: Overlord RAT Total IOCs: 11 IOC Types: ip:port
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 45[.]92[.]1[.]46:5173 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-30 | 50% |
| ip:port | 176[.]96[.]139[.]116:5173 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-30 | 50% |
| ip:port | 194[.]26[.]192[.]210:5173 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-30 | 50% |
| ip:port | 135[.]181[.]128[.]187:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-30 | 50% |
| ip:port | 64[.]89[.]163[.]84:5173 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-30 | 50% |
| ip:port | 104[.]249[.]10[.]76:5173 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-30 | 50% |
| ip:port | 85[.]11[.]167[.]56:5173 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-30 | 50% |
| ip:port | 77[.]110[.]110[.]117:5173 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-30 | 50% |
| ip:port | 193[.]233[.]126[.]136:5173 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-30 | 50% |
| ip:port | 104[.]249[.]10[.]18:5173 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-30 | 50% |
| ip:port | 89[.]19[.]223[.]95:5173 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-30 | 50% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Overlord RAT
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["104.249.10.18", "135.181.128.187", "64.89.163.84", "77.110.110.117", "194.26.192.210", "104.249.10.76", "89.19.223.95", "176.96.139.116", "45.92.1.46", "193.233.126.136", "85.11.167.56"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["104.249.10.18", "135.181.128.187", "64.89.163.84", "77.110.110.117", "194.26.192.210", "104.249.10.76", "89.19.223.95", "176.96.139.116", "45.92.1.46", "193.233.126.136", "85.11.167.56"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Overlord RAT IOCs detection rule, including targeted filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:
Scenario: Scheduled Cloud Backup Agent Communication
VeeamAgent.exe, rubrik-agent.exe, and vssvc.exe. Filter traffic where the destination IP belongs to known cloud provider CIDR blocks (e.g., 169.254.x.x or specific AWS/Azure ranges) and the connection duration exceeds 30 minutes, indicating a bulk transfer rather than a covert RAT beacon.Scenario: Microsoft Office 365 Telemetry and Update Services
Microsoft Office Click-to-Run.exe and svchost.exe (specific to Windows Update) where the destination domain resolves to *.office365.com, *.microsoft.com, or *.update.microsoft.com. Additionally, filter out connections occurring strictly between 02:00