ThreatFox: PureRAT IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary behavior where PureRAT establishes persistent remote access to exfiltrate sensitive data and gain full system control for espionage purposes. The SOC team should proactively search for these indicators in Azure Sentinel to identify early-stage compromises that could lead to significant data theft or unauthorized lateral movement before the attacker fully embeds within the environment.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: PureRAT Total IOCs: 10 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`193[.]26[.]115[.]17:56001`	botnet_cc	2026-08-07	75%
ip:port	`193[.]26[.]115[.]17:56002`	botnet_cc	2026-08-07	75%
ip:port	`193[.]26[.]115[.]17:56003`	botnet_cc	2026-08-07	75%
ip:port	`85[.]209[.]87[.]84:56002`	botnet_cc	2026-08-07	75%
ip:port	`45[.]89[.]48[.]12:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-07	75%
ip:port	`124[.]198[.]131[.]169:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-07	75%
ip:port	`103[.]249[.]116[.]184:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-07	75%
ip:port	`144[.]202[.]40[.]202:56001`	botnet_cc	2026-08-07	75%
ip:port	`144[.]202[.]40[.]202:56002`	botnet_cc	2026-08-07	75%
ip:port	`144[.]202[.]40[.]202:56003`	botnet_cc	2026-08-07	75%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - PureRAT
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["144.202.40.202", "124.198.131.169", "193.26.115.17", "103.249.116.184", "45.89.48.12", "85.209.87.84"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["144.202.40.202", "124.198.131.169", "193.26.115.17", "103.249.116.184", "45.89.48.12", "85.209.87.84"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — PureRAT

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: PureRAT IOCs detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Legitimate Remote Support Sessions via Managed Tools
- Context: Enterprise IT helpdesk teams frequently use remote access tools like BeyondTrust, TeamViewer, or Microsoft SCCM (Configuration Manager) to troubleshoot user workstations. These tools often establish persistent connections and execute commands that mimic the behavioral profile of a RAT, triggering the PureRAT detection due to similar network traffic patterns and process execution signatures.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion rule for processes originating from known support tool executables (e.g., BeyondTrust.Agent.exe, TeamViewer_Service.exe) running under the SYSTEM or specific Helpdesk Admin user accounts, specifically when connecting to internal IP ranges within the corporate DMZ.
Scenario: Scheduled Backup and Data Exfiltration Jobs
- Context: Automated backup solutions such as Veeam, Rubrik, or Microsoft Azure Backup Agent regularly exfiltrate large volumes of data to cloud repositories or on-premises storage arrays. The high-volume outbound traffic and specific file access patterns associated with these jobs can be misidentified as the data theft behavior characteristic of PureRAT.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude alerts generated during defined maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00–04:00 daily) for processes matching backup agent names (VeeamTransport.exe, AzureBackupAgent.exe) where the destination IP is a verified cloud storage endpoint or internal NAS server.
Scenario: Software Deployment and Patching via Endpoint Management
- Context: During peak patching cycles, tools like Jamf, Ivanti Neurons, or **WS