ThreatFox: PureRAT IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt hypothesis detects adversary behavior involving the deployment of PureRAT remote access trojans by monitoring for specific indicators of compromise such as malicious IP addresses and file hashes within the Azure Sentinel environment. A SOC team should proactively hunt for these IOCs to identify early-stage lateral movement and command-and-control communications that could lead to credential theft or data exfiltration before they escalate into broader incidents.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: PureRAT Total IOCs: 8 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`209[.]99[.]184[.]151:55006`	botnet_cc	2026-08-12	75%
ip:port	`209[.]99[.]184[.]151:55009`	botnet_cc	2026-08-12	75%
ip:port	`192[.]229[.]115[.]162:56002`	botnet_cc	2026-08-12	75%
ip:port	`192[.]229[.]115[.]154:56002`	botnet_cc	2026-08-12	75%
ip:port	`178[.]211[.]155[.]64:56001`	botnet_cc	2026-08-12	75%
ip:port	`172[.]245[.]23[.]153:56001`	botnet_cc	2026-08-12	75%
ip:port	`172[.]245[.]23[.]153:56002`	botnet_cc	2026-08-12	75%
ip:port	`172[.]245[.]23[.]153:56003`	botnet_cc	2026-08-12	75%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - PureRAT
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["192.229.115.162", "192.229.115.154", "209.99.184.151", "178.211.155.64", "172.245.23.153"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["192.229.115.162", "192.229.115.154", "209.99.184.151", "178.211.155.64", "172.245.23.153"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — PureRAT

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: PureRAT IOCs detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:

Endpoint Protection Scans by Defender or CrowdStrike
- Scenario: The organization’s primary EDR agents (e.g., Microsoft Defender for Endpoint or CrowdStrike Falcon) perform scheduled signature updates or deep scans that generate network traffic matching PureRAT IOCs. Specifically, the EDR service account often connects to update servers using IP ranges or domain hashes similar to those flagged by the rule.
- Suggested Filter: Exclude all events where the Process Name matches known EDR executables (e.g., MsMpEng.exe, CSFalconService.exe) and the User Account is a local system service account (e.g., NT SERVICE\DefenderSvc).
Software Deployment via SCCM or Intune
- Scenario: During enterprise-wide software deployments, System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Microsoft Intune agents download application packages from internal distribution points. These distribution points may host artifacts with file hashes or network destinations that overlap with PureRAT’s known IOCs, triggering alerts during peak deployment windows.
- Suggested Filter: Create an exclusion for traffic originating from the Process Name ccmsetup.exe or Microsoft.IntuneManagementAgent.exe where the destination IP falls within the internal corporate subnet range (e.g., 10.x.x.x).
Scheduled PowerShell Maintenance Scripts
- Scenario: IT Operations teams utilize scheduled Task Scheduler jobs to run PowerShell scripts for log rotation, backup verification, or compliance reporting. These scripts often invoke external APIs or download configuration files from internal repositories that share the same domain suffix or IP address as PureRAT IOCs.
- Suggested Filter: Exclude events