ThreatFox: Remcos IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt targets the presence of known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Remcos remote access trojan, which adversaries deploy to establish persistent control and exfiltrate data from compromised endpoints. Proactively hunting for these signatures in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to identify and isolate infected assets before the malware can be leveraged for lateral movement or long-term espionage within the environment.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Remcos Total IOCs: 5 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`147[.]90[.]182[.]42:2404`	botnet_cc	2026-09-28	100%
ip:port	`203[.]202[.]232[.]117:2424`	botnet_cc	2026-09-28	100%
ip:port	`216[.]9[.]224[.]180:2444`	botnet_cc	2026-09-28	100%
ip:port	`74[.]115[.]172[.]254:24041`	botnet_cc	2026-09-28	100%
ip:port	`2[.]25[.]222[.]233:8887`	botnet_cc	2026-09-28	100%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Remcos
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["74.115.172.254", "147.90.182.42", "2.25.222.233", "203.202.232.117", "216.9.224.180"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["74.115.172.254", "147.90.182.42", "2.25.222.233", "203.202.232.117", "216.9.224.180"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Remcos

False Positive Guidance

Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Client Installation via MSI
- Scenario: IT administrators or automated deployment tools (e.g., SCCM, Intune) install the mstsc.exe client or third-party RDP clients (like Royal TS or FreeRDP) which may share IOCs (such as specific DLL names or registry keys) with Remcos.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes where the parent executable is a known deployment agent (e.g., CcmExec.exe, IntuneAgent.exe) or where the install path resides in standard system directories like C:\Program Files\ or C:\Windows\System32\.
Legitimate Screen Sharing/Support Tools
- Scenario: Enterprise support tools such as TeamViewer, LogMeIn, or GoToMyPC often use similar hooking mechanisms or registry keys for remote control that overlap with Remcos IOCs.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes originating from known vendor directories (e.g., C:\Program Files\TeamViewer\, C:\Program Files\LogMeIn\) or where the process name matches known legitimate support binaries (e.g., teamviewer.exe, lmi.exe).
Scheduled Maintenance Jobs for Remote Access
- Scenario: Scheduled tasks created by IT for periodic remote access sessions or maintenance windows may launch RDP clients or remote control utilities from non-standard locations (e.g., C:\Scripts\ or C:\Temp\), triggering IOC matches for file paths or command lines.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude events where the parent process is schtasks.exe or taskschd.dll and the working directory or executable path is within a designated IT maintenance folder (e.g., C:\IT_Maintenance\, C:\Scripts\).