ThreatFox: Remus IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection rule identifies adversary activity by matching network and endpoint telemetry against four specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) linked to the Remus threat actor. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical because early identification of Remus-associated artifacts enables rapid containment of potential lateral movement or data exfiltration before broader compromise occurs.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Remus Total IOCs: 4 IOC Types: ip:port, url

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`104[.]168[.]123[.]242:3276`	botnet_cc	2026-08-02	100%
ip:port	`84[.]247[.]129[.]0:2930`	botnet_cc	2026-08-02	100%
ip:port	`200[.]9[.]154[.]45:8539`	botnet_cc	2026-08-02	100%
url	`hxxp://sxarth.click:3276`	botnet_cc	2026-08-02	75%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Remus
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["200.9.154.45", "84.247.129.0", "104.168.123.242"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["200.9.154.45", "84.247.129.0", "104.168.123.242"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

KQL: Url Hunt

// Hunt for access to known malicious URLs
// Source: ThreatFox - Remus
let malicious_urls = dynamic(["http://sxarth.click:3276"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (malicious_urls)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`UrlClickEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Remus

False Positive Guidance

Here are specific false positive scenarios and corresponding exclusion strategies for the ThreatFox: Remus IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Definition Updates via Remus Agent
- Context: The enterprise utilizes a centralized endpoint protection suite (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon or Microsoft Defender) where the “Remus” agent is configured to run nightly definition updates. These jobs often trigger network connections and file writes matching the 4 specific IOCs defined in the hunt package.
- Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Create a detection exclusion based on the Process Name (falcon.sys or MsMpEng.exe) combined with a Time Window. Configure the rule to ignore alerts occurring between 02:00 AM and 04:00 AM local time for these specific processes, as this aligns with standard maintenance windows.
Scenario: Automated Software Deployment via SCCM/Intune
- Context: The IT Operations team uses Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Intune to push a new version of the Remus security tool to a pilot group of 50 workstations. During this deployment, the installation service (ccmsetup.exe or msiexec) executes scripts that generate network traffic and registry changes identical to the threat IOCs.
- Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Implement an exclusion based on Source IP Range and Process Path. Exclude alerts where the initiating process path contains \Program Files\Microsoft Configuration Manager\ or matches the specific IP subnet assigned to the “Patch Management Server” (e.g., 10.20.5.0/24).
Scenario: Legacy Backup Job Execution
- Context: A legacy backup solution (e.g., Veeam or Commvault) runs a scheduled job that