This rule detects the presence of Stealc malware, which exfiltrates sensitive data and steals credentials through covert communication channels often established via phishing-delivered payloads. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to identify compromised endpoints early, preventing the malware from successfully establishing persistent command-and-control connections and extracting critical assets before they are exfiltrated.
Malware Family: Stealc Total IOCs: 3 IOC Types: url
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| url | hxxp://160[.]20[.]109[.]59 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-26 | 75% |
| url | hxxps://api.mb2-rrfdnb-ip38z5.shop | botnet_cc | 2026-09-26 | 75% |
| url | hxxps://api.mb2-rrfdnb-ip38z5.shop/ | botnet_cc | 2026-09-26 | 100% |
// Hunt for access to known malicious URLs
// Source: ThreatFox - Stealc
let malicious_urls = dynamic(["http://160.20.109.59", "https://api.mb2-rrfdnb-ip38z5.shop", "https://api.mb2-rrfdnb-ip38z5.shop/"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (malicious_urls)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
UrlClickEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
*.gophish.io, *.knowbe4.com) or tag traffic from the simulation server IP range as “Phishing Sim” in the SIEM.302 redirects for policy enforcement, SSL interception, or content filtering. If the proxy’s redirect header contains specific user-agent strings or path patterns that overlap with Stealc’s known IOCs, it can cause false positives on legitimate user browsing.
Server header matches known proxy signatures (e.g., Zscaler, Forcepoint) or filter out requests where the X-Forwarded-For chain indicates internal proxy infrastructure.*.rubrik.com, *.veeam.com) and exclude outbound connections to these domains from the Stealc IOC list, or filter by process name (e.g., veeam.exe, `rub