This hunt targets the presence of SVCStealer, a credential-stealing malware that often propagates via service control blocks, by correlating its known indicators of compromise against endpoint telemetry. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical because SVCStealer can silently exfiltrate stored credentials and establish persistence, allowing adversaries to pivot laterally through the environment before traditional detections trigger.
Malware Family: SVCStealer Total IOCs: 3 IOC Types: sha256_hash, sha1_hash, md5_hash
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sha1_hash | 0eedde175f5d230ee129dc4add72be8a32e7c05a | payload | 2026-09-24 | 95% |
| md5_hash | c705fea2fd2e6c119c1138f1b74cd798 | payload | 2026-09-24 | 95% |
| sha256_hash | 221e2c855e78d5cc7fb84738effb88bb11a47be6ce10530c909534e15f47e0b4 | payload | 2026-09-24 | 95% |
// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - SVCStealer
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["0eedde175f5d230ee129dc4add72be8a32e7c05a", "c705fea2fd2e6c119c1138f1b74cd798", "221e2c855e78d5cc7fb84738effb88bb11a47be6ce10530c909534e15f47e0b4"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
DeviceFileEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Scenario: A DevOps engineer uses PowerShell or cmd.exe to execute a custom script that queries the Windows Service Control Manager (SCM) to audit service configurations, potentially generating CreateService or QueryService events that match SVCStealer’s service manipulation IOCs.
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe or C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe and the command line contains keywords like Get-Service, sc query, or Get-WmiObject Win32_Service.Scenario: An IT administrator runs a standard backup or maintenance tool (e.g., Veeam, Commvault, or a custom PowerShell script) that temporarily stops and restarts critical services to ensure data consistency, triggering service state change IOCs.
Veeam.exe, commvault.exe) or where the parent process is a scheduled task (taskschd.msi) with a known maintenance task name (e.g., “Daily_Backup_Maintenance”).Scenario: A software deployment tool (e.g., SCCM, PDQ Deploy, or Chocolatey) installs or updates an application that includes a Windows service, causing the installation process to create or modify service entries, which may overlap with SVCStealer’s service creation IOCs.
CcmExec.exe for SCCM, PDQDeploy.exe, or choco.exe) and the service name matches the application being deployed (e.g., ServiceName contains the app name).Scenario: A security or compliance audit tool