ThreatFox: Vidar IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt hypothesis targets adversaries utilizing Vidar malware to covertly exfiltrate credentials and sensitive data through targeted IOCs within the Azure Sentinel environment. Proactive hunting is essential due to the high severity of Vidar’s ability to silently compromise organizational assets before traditional alerts trigger, allowing the SOC team to identify early-stage infections and mitigate potential data breaches.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Vidar Total IOCs: 18 IOC Types: sha256_hash, md5_hash, sha1_hash

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
sha256_hash	0c6481df65a681fda1687390258e80f944f39302f43cb8f3b44e105ade208d35	payload	2026-07-27	95%
sha1_hash	4ada6dc4d65fb0140e14c6c77c1493649b598180	payload	2026-07-27	95%
md5_hash	cc00c3d0b5b43385fca3378c5b86d62f	payload	2026-07-27	95%
sha1_hash	1cfab76ae6d607178bd827ec019639d4111a98a2	payload	2026-07-27	95%
md5_hash	f090a25b25faae55a0a11648a890b12e	payload	2026-07-27	95%
sha1_hash	7f07e04bac9bacca611cbf17faeb4c51023b74c1	payload	2026-07-27	95%
md5_hash	6a68ab6943313c4d3a38803d5a8220f9	payload	2026-07-27	95%
sha256_hash	0be457a4975587e112cc1027dd69302c5b549c30f706fdbd8a6b38aefe65c40f	payload	2026-07-27	95%
sha1_hash	de7058158b7d66c52628a644de65948e95319409	payload	2026-07-27	95%
md5_hash	ee9b4e39dc11f3d69fcaa4cadb4d5877	payload	2026-07-27	95%
sha256_hash	3a25c7bb48b995f62f57268c8ddfc38379d194cafb794832a00a0504649dc1d9	payload	2026-07-27	95%
sha1_hash	d46536ea19b177f95ea4e0568f901ca24cfdb42b	payload	2026-07-27	95%
md5_hash	00dbca757e6417308d3fc080010a6ff3	payload	2026-07-27	95%
sha256_hash	47619d7345812a0d9238054398fb88bc1679562a7421c1b59927fa67768df03a	payload	2026-07-27	95%
sha1_hash	c9803b820b9f78adb1650f4423f41741aaa29cf3	payload	2026-07-27	95%
md5_hash	97e69b9ef7bdb56475e676ab9b81b0e2	payload	2026-07-27	95%
sha256_hash	3abd369c9c2e1473522baf55605a5e81cf3943d8131c6d85fa66b5a247b44fbf	payload	2026-07-27	95%
sha256_hash	1a0e24c66991f2ef18b8b6b697b0fe3dbaefe3d3bae4698e732fb220c7c22f93	payload	2026-07-27	95%

KQL: Hash Hunt

// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["0c6481df65a681fda1687390258e80f944f39302f43cb8f3b44e105ade208d35", "4ada6dc4d65fb0140e14c6c77c1493649b598180", "cc00c3d0b5b43385fca3378c5b86d62f", "1cfab76ae6d607178bd827ec019639d4111a98a2", "f090a25b25faae55a0a11648a890b12e", "7f07e04bac9bacca611cbf17faeb4c51023b74c1", "6a68ab6943313c4d3a38803d5a8220f9", "0be457a4975587e112cc1027dd69302c5b549c30f706fdbd8a6b38aefe65c40f", "de7058158b7d66c52628a644de65948e95319409", "ee9b4e39dc11f3d69fcaa4cadb4d5877", "3a25c7bb48b995f62f57268c8ddfc38379d194cafb794832a00a0504649dc1d9", "d46536ea19b177f95ea4e0568f901ca24cfdb42b", "00dbca757e6417308d3fc080010a6ff3", "47619d7345812a0d9238054398fb88bc1679562a7421c1b59927fa67768df03a", "c9803b820b9f78adb1650f4423f41741aaa29cf3", "97e69b9ef7bdb56475e676ab9b81b0e2", "3abd369c9c2e1473522baf55605a5e81cf3943d8131c6d85fa66b5a247b44fbf", "1a0e24c66991f2ef18b8b6b697b0fe3dbaefe3d3bae4698e732fb220c7c22f93"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
DeviceFileEvents	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

• ThreatFox — Vidar

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Vidar IOCs detection rule, tailored for a legitimate enterprise environment:

• Scenario: Automated Backup Agent Scanning Network Shares

  • Context: Enterprise backup solutions (e.g., Veeam, Rubrik, or Commvault) frequently scan and enumerate network shares to identify new files for exfiltration. Vidar’s behavior of scanning directories and accessing sensitive files can mimic the activity of these agents when they are running scheduled jobs during business hours.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create a rule exclusion based on the specific Service Principal Name (SPN) or Hostname of the backup server (e.g., hostname=BACKUP-SRV-01 AND process_name=VeeamTransport.exe). Additionally, exclude traffic originating from the dedicated “Backup VLAN” IP range.

• Scenario: Endpoint DLP Agent Real-Time Monitoring

  • Context: Data Loss Prevention (DLP) solutions like Symantec DLP or Microsoft Purview run continuous background processes that hook into file system events to classify and tag sensitive data. These agents often exhibit high I/O activity and credential scanning behaviors similar to Vidar’s initial infection phase, triggering the rule when a user opens a large document containing PII.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude process hashes belonging to known DLP agents (e.g., process_hash=... for SymantecDLP.exe). If the detection relies on network traffic, filter out connections destined for the internal DLP management server IP range.

• Scenario: Scheduled Credential Harvesting by IT Admin Scripts

  • Context: System administrators often run PowerShell or Python scripts to audit Active Directory credentials or migrate user profiles. These scripts (e.g., PowerShell.exe running a custom .ps1 script) may query the registry