This hunt detects adversary behavior involving the deployment of Vidar malware by matching network and endpoint telemetry against a curated set of 67 specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs). A SOC team should proactively hunt for these signals in Azure Sentinel to identify early-stage infections and prevent potential data exfiltration or lateral movement associated with this prevalent infostealer.
Malware Family: Vidar Total IOCs: 67 IOC Types: url, domain, ip:port
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 89[.]167[.]18[.]40:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| ip:port | 62[.]238[.]20[.]117:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| ip:port | 46[.]62[.]173[.]126:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| ip:port | 2[.]28[.]53[.]243:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| ip:port | 46[.]62[.]167[.]86:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| ip:port | 178[.]104[.]167[.]253:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| ip:port | 2[.]28[.]63[.]136:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| ip:port | 78[.]47[.]230[.]34:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| ip:port | 89[.]167[.]23[.]148:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| domain | spc.sinism188.top | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| domain | tis.sinism188.top | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| domain | sep.beras1.com | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| domain | rha.beras1.com | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| domain | gve.beras1.com | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| domain | ttf.beras1.com | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| domain | rne.sm188auto.top | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| domain | ndd.sm188auto.top | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| domain | sep.sm188auto.top | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| domain | rha.sm188auto.top | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| domain | gve.sm188auto.top | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| domain | ttf.sm188auto.top | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| domain | blh.slotmacau188e.top | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| domain | dfd.slotmacau188e.top | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| domain | ran.slotmacau188e.top | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
| domain | ign.slotmacau188e.top | botnet_cc | 2026-08-10 | 100% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["78.47.230.34", "89.167.23.148", "46.62.167.86", "2.28.63.136", "46.62.173.126", "2.28.53.243", "178.104.167.253", "62.238.20.117", "89.167.18.40"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["78.47.230.34", "89.167.23.148", "46.62.167.86", "2.28.63.136", "46.62.173.126", "2.28.53.243", "178.104.167.253", "62.238.20.117", "89.167.18.40"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["spc.sinism188.top", "tis.sinism188.top", "sep.beras1.com", "rha.beras1.com", "gve.beras1.com", "ttf.beras1.com", "rne.sm188auto.top", "ndd.sm188auto.top", "sep.sm188auto.top", "rha.sm188auto.top", "gve.sm188auto.top", "ttf.sm188auto.top", "blh.slotmacau188e.top", "dfd.slotmacau188e.top", "ran.slotmacau188e.top", "ign.slotmacau188e.top", "xox.slotmacau188bd.top", "xox.sinism188.top", "pas.bikhoki.cc", "rne.beras1.com", "ndd.beras1.com", "xop.sm188auto.top", "xop.beras1.com"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt for access to known malicious URLs
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_urls = dynamic(["https://46.62.173.126/", "https://2.28.53.243/", "https://46.62.167.86/", "https://178.104.167.253/", "https://2.28.63.136/", "https://78.47.230.34/", "https://spc.sinism188.top/", "https://tis.sinism188.top/", "https://89.167.18.40/", "https://62.238.20.117/", "https://dfd.slotmacau188e.top/", "https://ran.slotmacau188e.top/", "https://www.slotmacau188e.top/", "https://ign.slotmacau188e.top/", "https://xox.slotmacau188bd.top/", "https://xox.sinism188.top/", "https://ndd.sm188auto.top/", "https://sep.sm188auto.top/", "https://rha.sm188auto.top/", "https://gve.sm188auto.top/", "https://ttf.sm188auto.top/", "https://blh.slotmacau188e.top/", "https://sep.beras1.com/", "https://rha.beras1.com/", "https://gve.beras1.com/", "https://ttf.beras1.com/", "https://steamcommunity.com/profiles/76561198660175584", "https://telegram.me/j0tt0s", "https://rne.beras1.com/", "https://ndd.beras1.com/"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (malicious_urls)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DnsEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
UrlClickEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are specific false positive scenarios and corresponding filters/exclusions for the ThreatFox: Vidar IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment:
Scenario 1: Scheduled Antivirus or EDR Definition Updates
C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\csagent.exe or MsMpEng.exe) and exclude network connections to known vendor update domains (e.g., *.crowdstrike.com, *.microsoft.com).Scenario 2: Legitimate Third-Party Backup Solutions
vbrsvc.exe, rubrik-agent.exe) and filter out events occurring during defined maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00–04:00 local time) for these specific service accounts.Scenario 3: Admin-Driven Patch Management Deployments