ThreatFox: Vidar IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies active threats leveraging Vidar malware indicators to uncover potential command-and-control communications and data exfiltration activities within the environment. Proactive hunting is essential in Azure Sentinel to rapidly isolate compromised endpoints and prevent lateral movement before attackers can establish persistent access or steal sensitive credentials.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Vidar Total IOCs: 6 IOC Types: sha256_hash, md5_hash, sha1_hash

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
sha256_hash	`1cfa40843d9e169e9df5d61ab7b6cc6db59a3237b8a3ca9a3fa047ef836d7453`	payload	2026-07-25	95%
sha1_hash	`aaa95d93a0a792db0411868121413e0cdc453373`	payload	2026-07-25	95%
md5_hash	`91092ecc0a5a3866dea9fb5088e6ad74`	payload	2026-07-25	95%
sha1_hash	`87a59eb6074958aaa81799312861574b2ea90527`	payload	2026-07-25	95%
md5_hash	`9bd97475aa0d8fb22a284d070a2ee795`	payload	2026-07-25	95%
sha256_hash	`7153c7609816c1a5c2882dd7889cd2db9050813f3e5220f76e19f238709ad2d2`	payload	2026-07-25	95%

KQL: Hash Hunt

// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["1cfa40843d9e169e9df5d61ab7b6cc6db59a3237b8a3ca9a3fa047ef836d7453", "aaa95d93a0a792db0411868121413e0cdc453373", "91092ecc0a5a3866dea9fb5088e6ad74", "87a59eb6074958aaa81799312861574b2ea90527", "9bd97475aa0d8fb22a284d070a2ee795", "7153c7609816c1a5c2882dd7889cd2db9050813f3e5220f76e19f238709ad2d2"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`DeviceFileEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Vidar

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios and corresponding filters for the ThreatFox: Vidar IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus or EDR Full Scans
- Context: Enterprise Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) platforms like CrowdStrike Falcon, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, or Symantec Endpoint Protection often perform scheduled full scans. During these scans, the agents may query internal threat intelligence feeds that share hash values or domain patterns similar to Vidar’s known IOCs, triggering a match without actual malicious activity.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes where the Process_Name matches known EDR scanner executables (e.g., C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\FalconSensor\csfalcon.exe, MsMpEng.exe) and the event type is “File Scan” or “Network Connection” initiated by a scheduled task.
Scenario: Legitimate Software Updates via Package Managers
- Context: IT administrators frequently use package management tools like Chocolatey, Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM), or Ansible to deploy software updates across the fleet. If an update package for a legitimate application (e.g., Adobe Acrobat, Zoom) contains a component with a hash matching one of Vidar’s IOCs, the deployment agent will trigger the rule during installation.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion based on Source_Process_Name containing known deployment tools (e.g., choco.exe, ccmsetup.exe) and restrict the alert to only trigger if the user context is not a “System” or specific “Deployment Service Account.”
Scenario: Internal Threat Intelligence Feed Synchronization
- Context: Security Operations Centers often run internal SIEM correlation jobs (using tools like Splunk, **QR