The ThreatFox: VShell IOCs rule detects potential adversary activity associated with the VShell malware, which is known for its persistence and lateral movement capabilities. SOC teams should proactively hunt for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel to identify and mitigate advanced threats that could compromise critical systems.
IOC Summary
Malware Family: VShell Total IOCs: 4 IOC Types: ip:port
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 31[.]192[.]107[.]180:7000 | botnet_cc | 2026-05-22 | 100% |
| ip:port | 110[.]42[.]189[.]163:8084 | botnet_cc | 2026-05-22 | 100% |
| ip:port | 154[.]89[.]149[.]239:18881 | botnet_cc | 2026-05-22 | 100% |
| ip:port | 13[.]212[.]52[.]242:8084 | botnet_cc | 2026-05-22 | 100% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - VShell
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["154.89.149.239", "110.42.189.163", "31.192.107.180", "13.212.52.242"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["154.89.149.239", "110.42.189.163", "31.192.107.180", "13.212.52.242"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Scenario: Scheduled System Maintenance Task
Description: A legitimate scheduled task runs a script that uses vshell as part of a system maintenance routine, such as log rotation or backup.
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes initiated by schtasks.exe or tasks with a known maintenance name (e.g., BackupTask, LogRotate).
Scenario: Admin Use of VShell for Remote Management
Description: An administrator uses VShell to securely connect to a remote server for troubleshooting or configuration changes.
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude connections originating from known admin IP ranges or user accounts with elevated privileges (e.g., Administrator, root).
Scenario: Automated Deployment Tool Integration
Description: A CI/CD pipeline (e.g., Jenkins, GitLab CI) uses VShell to deploy code to a remote server as part of an automated deployment process.
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes initiated by CI/CD agents or with job names matching known deployment patterns (e.g., deploy_prod, ci_build).
Scenario: Log Analysis Tool Using VShell for Data Transfer
Description: A log analysis tool (e.g., Splunk, ELK Stack) uses VShell to transfer log files between servers for centralized logging.
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes associated with log management tools or with file paths matching known log directories (e.g., /var/log/, /opt/splunk/).
Scenario: Internal Network Monitoring Tool
Description: An internal network monitoring tool (e.g., Nagios, Zabbix) uses VShell to check the status of remote services or nodes.
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes initiated by monitoring tools or with service check names (e.g., check_http, check_disk), and filter by internal IP ranges