ThreatFox: VShell IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection rule identifies adversary activity involving six specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) linked to the VShell threat actor, which often targets enterprise environments through initial access and command execution vectors. A SOC team should proactively hunt for these signals within Azure Sentinel to rapidly detect early-stage intrusions by VShell, enabling timely containment before lateral movement or data exfiltration occurs.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: VShell Total IOCs: 6 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`38[.]190[.]198[.]30:18080`	botnet_cc	2026-08-03	100%
ip:port	`154[.]89[.]148[.]121:18084`	botnet_cc	2026-08-03	100%
ip:port	`60[.]185[.]78[.]107:8084`	botnet_cc	2026-08-03	100%
ip:port	`101[.]42[.]176[.]50:8084`	botnet_cc	2026-08-03	100%
ip:port	`47[.]236[.]130[.]154:58357`	botnet_cc	2026-08-03	100%
ip:port	`43[.]139[.]174[.]4:8443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-03	100%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - VShell
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["38.190.198.30", "47.236.130.154", "154.89.148.121", "43.139.174.4", "60.185.78.107", "101.42.176.50"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["38.190.198.30", "47.236.130.154", "154.89.148.121", "43.139.174.4", "60.185.78.107", "101.42.176.50"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — VShell

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: VShell IOCs detection rule, along with targeted filtering strategies suitable for an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Scheduled Backup Executions via Admin Accounts
- Context: Enterprise backup solutions (e.g., Veeam, Commvault) often run nightly jobs under a dedicated service account that connects to the VShell management interface to archive logs or verify integrity. These legitimate connections match the IOCs because they utilize standard ports and protocols associated with VShell.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion rule for traffic originating from specific backup server IP ranges (e.g., 10.20.45.x) where the source user is a known service account (e.g., svc_backup_admin). Additionally, exclude events occurring during defined maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00–04:00 UTC).
Scenario: Patch Management Deployment Workflows
- Context: Automated patching tools like Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Ivanti frequently push updates to the VShell infrastructure. During these windows, the management server initiates multiple connections to apply patches and verify system health, triggering the 6 IOCs as part of the deployment handshake.
- Filter/Exclusion: Filter out alerts where the source process name contains keywords like ccmsetup.exe, IvantiAgent, or wsusdc. Combine this with a time-based exclusion for known patch cycles (e.g., every Tuesday and Thursday between 01:00–03:00).
Scenario: Third-Party SIEM/EDR Data Ingestion
- Context: Security platforms such as Splunk, CrowdStrike Falcon, or SentinelOne often ingest telemetry data from the