ThreatFox: WarLock IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection rule identifies adversary activity by matching network and endpoint telemetry against nine specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) linked to the WarLock threat actor. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical because WarLock’s high-severity campaigns often target enterprise infrastructure, requiring early identification to mitigate potential data exfiltration or lateral movement before full compromise occurs.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: WarLock Total IOCs: 9 IOC Types: md5_hash

KQL: Hash Hunt

// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - WarLock
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["a7fd97ff3685cb971650922c12725e8b", "843df3ad51fb7c3d35e6f65545bb710b", "dd7f096c647581f6c639e5c3dc7d1e7e", "016802863edd6de4503ffa5d815d90b4", "2bc0e73148e07ade9ea1f2df31ca1c1b", "3c624e9f786189d001dab2649ade0eb9", "758c6a86871370406e477e8ea53d2d8d", "66b521a1eccf3b28906299768ee77222", "c6bf6be91257d4625dc4e8778b313d6b"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

References

• ThreatFox — WarLock

False Positive Guidance

Here are specific false positive scenarios and corresponding filters for the ThreatFox: WarLock IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment:

• Scenario: Enterprise Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) performing scheduled signature updates that match WarLock’s known hash signatures.

  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes where the ParentProcessName is the specific EDR service (e.g., FalconSensorService.exe or MsMpEng.exe) and the ProcessCommandLine contains keywords like “update,” “sync,” or “signature.”

• Scenario: Automated vulnerability scanning jobs executed by tools such as Tenable Nessus, Qualys Cloud Agent, or Rapid7 InsightVM that probe internal assets using WarLock-associated IP ranges or file hashes.

  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion for source IPs belonging to the corporate security management subnet (e.g., 10.20.x.x) and filter out events where the UserAccount is a dedicated service account named “VulnScan-Svc” or similar.

• Scenario: Scheduled backup jobs using enterprise solutions like Veeam Backup & Replication or Commvault that archive data to repositories utilizing WarLock’s file integrity signatures during the initial indexing phase.

  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude events occurring during defined maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00–04:00 daily) where the ProcessName matches backup agents (VeeamAgent.exe, CommServe.exe) and the action is limited to “Read” or “Indexing.”

• Scenario: IT administrators manually deploying security patches via Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Ivanti Neurons, which trigger file creation events matching WarLock IOCs on user workstations.

  • **Filter/