Disclosed hacktool set - file tzddos

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection rule identifies adversaries deploying the “tzddos” hacktool to establish persistent command-and-control channels or execute lateral movement within the Azure environment. Proactive hunting for this specific artifact is critical because its presence often signals an early-stage compromise where attackers are installing reconnaissance tools before initiating broader data exfiltration or privilege escalation activities.

YARA Rule

rule Tzddos_DDoS_Tool_CN {
	meta:
		description = "Disclosed hacktool set - file tzddos"
		author = "Florian Roth"
		date = "17.11.14"
		score = 60
		hash = "d4c517eda5458247edae59309453e0ae7d812f8e"
	strings:
		$s0 = "for /f %%a in (host.txt) do (" fullword ascii
		$s1 = "for /f \"eol=S tokens=1 delims= \" %%i in (s2.txt) do echo %%i>>host.txt" fullword ascii
		$s2 = "del host.txt /q" fullword ascii
		$s3 = "for /f \"eol=- tokens=1 delims= \" %%i in (result.txt) do echo %%i>>s1.txt" fullword ascii
		$s4 = "start Http.exe %%a %http%" fullword ascii
		$s5 = "for /f \"eol=P tokens=1 delims= \" %%i in (s1.txt) do echo %%i>>s2.txt" fullword ascii
		$s6 = "del Result.txt s2.txt s1.txt " fullword ascii
	condition:
		all of them
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 7 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the Disclosed hacktool set - file tzddos detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:

• Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment via WSUS/SCCM

  • Context: Enterprise Configuration Management tools like Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Windows Update Services often deploy security patches that include the tzddos component as part of a broader “Time Zone and DDoS Protection” update package. The installation process creates the file in the system directory, triggering the rule during scheduled maintenance windows.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion for processes originating from specific deployment agents (e.g., ccmsetup.exe, wuauserv.exe) running under the SYSTEM or NT SERVICE\WUAUSERV accounts. Additionally, exclude file paths located within standard patch directories like C:\Windows\System32\wbem\ or C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\SCCM.

• Scenario: Scheduled Endpoint Protection Scans

  • Context: Third-party endpoint security suites (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne, or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) frequently utilize internal utilities named tzddos to perform real-time time-synchronization checks or DDoS mitigation heuristics during their scheduled daily scan cycles. This activity is legitimate but mimics the behavior of a disclosed hacktool.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Implement a filter based on the parent process name. Exclude events where the parent process matches known security agents (e.g., FalconSensorService.exe, S1Agent.exe, or MsMpEng.exe). Ensure the exclusion applies only when the file is created within the vendor’s specific installation directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\ or C:\ProgramData\McAfee\).