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UAC Bypass With Fake DLL

sigma HIGH SigmaHQ
T1548.002T1574.001
DeviceImageLoadEvents
evasion
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at SigmaHQ →
Retrieved: 2026-05-05T11:00:00Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

Attempts to load dismcore.dll after dropping it

Detection Rule

Sigma (Original)

title: UAC Bypass With Fake DLL
id: a5ea83a7-05a5-44c1-be2e-addccbbd8c03
status: test
description: Attempts to load dismcore.dll after dropping it
references:
    - https://steemit.com/utopian-io/@ah101/uac-bypassing-utility
author: oscd.community, Dmitry Uchakin
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1548.002
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\dism.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\dismcore.dll'
    filter:
        ImageLoaded: 'C:\Windows\System32\Dism\dismcore.dll'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Actions of a legitimate telnet client
level: high

KQL (Microsoft 365 Defender)

DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\dism.exe" and FolderPath endswith "\\dismcore.dll") and (not(FolderPath =~ "C:\\Windows\\System32\\Dism\\dismcore.dll"))

Required Data Sources

Sentinel TableNotes
DeviceImageLoadEventsEnsure this data connector is enabled

False Positive Guidance

MITRE ATT&CK Context

References

Original source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_uac_bypass_via_dism.yml