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UEFI Persistence Via Wpbbin - FileCreation

sigma HIGH SigmaHQ
T1542.001
imFileEvent
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at SigmaHQ →
Retrieved: 2026-03-25T03:05:59Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

The detection identifies the creation of a file named wpbbin in the Windows directory, which is a common indicator of UEFI persistence used by adversaries to maintain long-term access. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify and mitigate potential advanced persistent threats that leverage firmware-level persistence techniques.

Detection Rule

Sigma (Original)

title: UEFI Persistence Via Wpbbin - FileCreation
id: e94b9ddc-eec5-4bb8-8a58-b9dc5f4e185f
status: test
description: Detects creation of a file named "wpbbin" in the "%systemroot%\system32\" directory. Which could be indicative of UEFI based persistence method
references:
    - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/wpbbin.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-18
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1542.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename: 'C:\Windows\System32\wpbbin.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of the file by hardware manufacturer such as lenovo (Thanks @0gtweet for the tip)
level: high

KQL (Azure Sentinel)

imFileEvent
| where TargetFileName =~ "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wpbbin.exe"

False Positive Guidance

MITRE ATT&CK Context

Original source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_wpbbin_persistence.yml