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UEFI Persistence Via Wpbbin - ProcessCreation

sigma HIGH SigmaHQ
T1542.001
imProcessCreate
persistence
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at SigmaHQ →
Retrieved: 2026-05-23T23:00:00Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

Detects execution of the binary “wpbbin” which is used as part of the UEFI based persistence method described in the reference section

Detection Rule

Sigma (Original)

title: UEFI Persistence Via Wpbbin - ProcessCreation
id: 4abc0ec4-db5a-412f-9632-26659cddf145
status: test
description: Detects execution of the binary "wpbbin" which is used as part of the UEFI based persistence method described in the reference section
references:
    - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/wpbbin.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-18
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1542.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\wpbbin.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of the file by hardware manufacturer such as lenovo (Thanks @0gtweet for the tip)
level: high

KQL (Azure Sentinel)

imProcessCreate
| where TargetProcessName =~ "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wpbbin.exe"

Required Data Sources

Sentinel TableNotes
imProcessCreateEnsure this data connector is enabled

False Positive Guidance

MITRE ATT&CK Context

References

Original source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wpbbin_potential_persistence.yml