This hypothesis targets the execution of 32-bit malicious payloads delivered via known URLhaus entries, indicating an adversary is actively deploying architecture-specific malware to compromise endpoints. Proactively hunting for these indicators in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to identify and isolate affected hosts before the 32-bit binaries can establish persistence or lateral movement within the environment.
Threat: 32-bit Total URLs: 7 Active URLs: 4
| URL | Status | Threat | Date Added |
|---|---|---|---|
hxxp://112.252.198.182:39918/i | online | malware_download | 2026-09-24 |
hxxp://182.120.148.13:49700/bin.sh | online | malware_download | 2026-09-24 |
hxxp://218.74.50.31:41585/i | offline | malware_download | 2026-09-24 |
hxxp://42.234.154.101:40746/bin.sh | online | malware_download | 2026-09-24 |
hxxp://218.74.50.31:41585/bin.sh | offline | malware_download | 2026-09-24 |
hxxp://115.56.159.3:39106/i | offline | malware_download | 2026-09-24 |
hxxp://115.56.159.3:39106/bin.sh | online | malware_download | 2026-09-24 |
// Hunt for DNS resolution of URLhaus malicious domains
// Threat: 32-bit
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["112.252.198.182", "115.56.159.3", "42.234.154.101", "182.120.148.13"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt for web traffic to URLhaus malicious domains
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["112.252.198.182", "115.56.159.3", "42.234.154.101", "182.120.148.13"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where RequestURL has_any (malicious_domains) or DestinationHostName has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, RequestURL, DestinationHostName, DeviceAction
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DnsEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) LegacyApp/2.1) or whitelist the specific hash of the 32-bit executable if it is signed by a trusted internal CA.BackupIntegrityCheck) and exclude if the process is running under a dedicated service account (e.g., svc-backup) with a known PID range.iexplore.exe or chrome32.exe) and the URL matches the specific update path (e.g., /plugins/update/) rather than a generic landing page.